


HR70-14

~~Secret~~

APPROVED FOR
RELEASE -
HISTORICAL
COLLECTION
DIVISION DATE:
06-18-2012



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE


Intelligence Report

*Policy and Politics in the CPSU Politburo:
October 1964 to September 1967*

(Reference Title: CAESAR XXX)

~~Secret~~

31 August 1967
RSS No. 0021/67



GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE CPSU POLITBURO:
OCTOBER 1964 TO SEPTEMBER 1967

This working paper of the DDI/Special Research Staff examines the internal politics of the highest policy-making body in the Soviet Union--the politburo of the CPSU central committee--and examines the policies advocated by the various politburo leaders.

Although this study has not been coordinated with other offices, the authors, Leonard Parkinson and Carl Linden, are grateful to colleagues in other offices of the Agency for their suggestions and, in particular, for the review of the draft [redacted] both of OCI.

The DDI/SRS would welcome further comment on the study, addressed to Mr. Parkinson or to the Acting Chief of the Staff, [redacted]

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE CPSU POLITBURO:
OCTOBER 1964 TO SEPTEMBER 1967

<u>Contents</u>	<u>Page</u>
Conclusions.	i
INTRODUCTION.	1
PART ONE: PATTERNS OF POLITICAL ALIGNMENT IN THE POLITBURO.	3
Power And Policy Orientations.	3
Conservatism In The Party's General Line.	6
Brezhnev And The Power Struggle.	10
Kosygin's Problems.	10
Shelepin's Unsuccessful Struggle.	13
Suslov's Influence.	16
Brezhnev's Prospects.	17
PART TWO: PATTERNS IN POLITBURO LEADERS POLICY REMARKS.	19
Brezhnev: Hostility Abroad, Discipline At Home.	20
The Hard Line Toward The United States.	21
Defense And Vigilance At Home.	32
Kosygin: Cooperation Abroad, Reform At Home.	36
Improving Relations With The United States.	37
Balancing The Domestic Economy.	53
Podgornyy: Firmness Abroad, Well-Being At Home.	57
Hostility Toward America, Cooperation With Europe.	58
Personal Prosperity And Production.	61
Suslov: U.S. Main Foreign Danger, Party "Impurity" Main Domestic Danger.	67
Shelepin: Militancy Abroad, The Hard Line At Home.	71
Polyanskiy: Reform At Home, Caution Abroad.	75
Voronov: Production And Pragmatism.	78
Mazurov: Ideological Discipline and Conservatism.	79
Shelest: Organizational Discipline And Defense.	82
Kirilenko: Reform And Well-Being "Now".	83
Pelshe: The Cautious Newcomer.	84
Candidate (Non-Voting) Members: Andropov, Demichev, Kunayev, Grishin, Mzhavanadze, Rashidov, Shcherbitskiy, Ustinov, Masherov.	85
CONCLUDING OBSERVATION.	93

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

List Of Illustrations

Brezhnev And Kosygin.	11
Shelepin.	14
Podgornyy.	58
Suslov.	67
Polyanskiy And Voronov.	78
Mazurov, Shelest, Kirilenko, And Pelshe.	80

SECRET

SECRET

POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE CPSU POLITBURO:
OCTOBER 1964 TO SEPTEMBER 1967

Conclusions

A majority of the politburo members have echoed General Secretary Brezhnev's position on most foreign and domestic policy matters. The emphasis in Brezhnev's overall position is on the persistence of international dangers. He has pictured U.S. "imperialism" as on the offensive in various parts of the world, and has stressed the need to build Soviet strength to increase the effectiveness of Soviet policy in the external world. Some members of Brezhnev's politburo majority have enthusiastically taken up his platform, others have lent him only lukewarm support. However, the salient feature of this majority is its complex mixture. That is, while certain leaders support Brezhnev on major policy matters, the same leaders have chosen to back up certain key segments of Premier Kosygin's domestic and foreign policies. Kosygin has struck optimistic notes on long-term international trends. He has tended to leave more room for further improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations, as a condition favoring major efforts at overcoming economic imbalances at home.

Divergent treatment of the nature of the Vietnam war highlights the contrasting world outlooks of Brezhnev and Kosygin. Brezhnev has pictured the Vietnam war as only one of many obstacles blocking any substantial improvement of relations with the United States. In his various speeches he has presented the Vietnam war as a symptom rather than a cause of what he regards as a historical period of "danger" and "complications" in international affairs. On the other hand, the Vietnam war has been the central problem for Kosygin's line on foreign policy in general, and policy toward the United States in particular. The implementation of his major foreign and domestic policies has suffered reversals which have coincided with the intensification of the Vietnam conflict. These goals, such as a reduction in the Soviet military's share of the budget and a substantial expansion

SECRET

SECRET

of U.S.-Soviet trade, which he outlined during his first months as premier, have been sidetracked. During the first few months of his incumbency, Kosygin's statements on Soviet aid to North Vietnam fitted his detente-oriented outlook, while Brezhnev's displayed a tendency to minimize prospects for improving relations with the United States. For example, in December 1964--before the stepped-up U.S. military effort in North and South Vietnam--Kosygin's line on aiding the North was made conditional on what unspecified "aggressors" might do; Brezhnev's line pointedly threatened to render military assistance to the North on the basis of what U.S. aircraft and naval vessels had already done in early August and mid-September 1964. Subsequently, Brezhnev repeatedly debunked U.S. efforts to bring the Vietnam issue to the negotiating table, while Kosygin expressed favor for the exploitation of opportunities to commence talks. This past spring, Kosygin was indirectly criticized for being "naive" on this score by Brezhnev--a consistent advocate for Soviet defense interests.

Regarding the matter of Soviet defense allocations, Kosygin has employed the Khrushchevian argument that an East-West war "would inevitably be" thermonuclear and fatal for many countries. Brezhnev has argued that such a war "could become" thermonuclear and he has stopped short of spelling out the consequences. Brezhnev's argument is the one used by the Soviet military high command in justification of its effort to expand the conventional branches of the Soviet defense force rather than reduce those forces which (in Kosygin's view) would not be put to use in the East-West cataclysm. Accordingly, Brezhnev has placed great emphasis on the priority development of the heavy industry-defense sector of the Soviet economy and has regarded consumer well-being as a future consequence of industrial and agricultural successes. Kosygin on the other hand, has generally placed consumer welfare before defense and heavy industry in listing the domestic tasks of the party.

The complex character of Brezhnev's majority is manifested by the other politburo leaders' treatment of

SECRET

SECRET

the sensitive matter of resource allocations.* Thus, while Podgornyy, Polyanskiy and Kirilenko have (with varying degrees of warmth) generally hewed to Brezhnev's hard line toward the United States, those same three leaders make an about-face with regard to Brezhnev's line on the preferential development of the heavy-defense industries sector. On the issue of industrial priorities, six of the eleven politburo members have clearly expressed favor for the continued dominance of the heavy industry sector--Brezhnev, Suslov, Shelepin, Voronov, Mazurov, and Shelest; four have favored a more balanced economy--Kosygin, Podgornyy, Polyanskiy, and Kirilenko; only one, Pelshe, has skirted the problem. And while Voronov has sided with the "metal eaters" on this domestic issue, he has voiced, along with Podgornyy and Polyanskiy, Kosygin's emphasis on the influence of domestic economic example for the "world Communist revolution."

The composition of Brezhnev's policy majority becomes further complicated on examining each individual leader's support for certain politically-related issues, such as the apparent effort to circumscribe the executive authority of Kosygin's Council of Ministers by strengthening

*The chief responsibilities of the other politburo members are as follows: Podgornyy, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (the titular head of state); Polyanskiy, one of two First Deputy Chairmen on Kosygin's Council of Ministers (Polyanskiy's chief responsibility is agriculture); Kirilenko, member of the secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee in charge of RSFSR party affairs; Suslov, a secretariat member in charge of foreign affairs and ideology; Shelepin, a secretariat member demoted in July this year to head the Soviet trade union organization; Voronov, a member of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the Soviet Union's largest republic, the RSFSR; Mazurov, the other First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Mazurov's chief responsibility is industry); Shelest, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian party; and Pelshe, in charge of party control (discipline).

-iii-

SECRET

SECRET

Podgornyy's parliament, the Supreme Soviet. On this score, for example, only five of the eleven full politburo members--Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Shelest, Suslov and Pelshe--have on the record endorsed proposals to increase the role of the Supreme Soviet in its dealings with the Council of Ministers. The line-up in the oligarchy on the parliament-versus-ministry matter perhaps best illustrates one type of restraint imposed on Brezhnev's drive for power. That is, that Brezhnev must act with caution because any move that would result in sudden and major gains in his personal power could precipitate adverse and (politically) fatal reaction by a majority in the "collective" leadership.

The fact of the matter remains that Brezhnev has a strategic advantage organizationally over his actual and potential competitors. All the signs suggest that he has gradually strengthened his position. The signs also suggest that Brezhnev, at least for the near future, will continue his hard line toward the United States (but avoid high risk in genuine crises) and continue his effort toward Western Europe aimed at (1) removing the U.S. presence from Western Europe, (2) fragmenting NATO, (3) strengthening the Soviet position and influence in the Warsaw Pact, and (4) expanding CPSU influence through the agency of local parties in West European politics. In this connection, Brezhnev has been speaking of the applicability of the peaceful coexistence concept to the European continent, despite his tendency to downplay the concept in general and in particular with regard to U.S.-Soviet relations.

SECRET

SECRET

POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE CPSU POLITBURO:
OCTOBER 1964 TO SEPTEMBER 1967

Introduction

Israel's lightning-swift and massive victory over the Soviet-equipped Arab forces in the recent Middle East crisis was one of those sudden and illusion-shattering external events that can have a deep but unpredictable impact on the internal politics of the Soviet leadership. At the least it has already produced an unprecedented degree of turbulence and visible strain within the post-Khrushchev oligarchy. The leading group had succeeded relatively well in conveying a public image of effective, though uninspired, "collectivity" despite internal differences. Throughout the crisis, indeed, there was no change in the leadership's most notable characteristic. It was militant in theory but careful in practice, harsh in word but restrained in action. In the Middle East crisis Moscow's tough statements and hackneyed diatribes against Israel and "imperialism" were counter-balanced by Kosygin's talks with President Johnson at Glassboro and the avoidance of high-risk in the heat of the crisis. This pattern was rooted both in the closed system of politburo* politics which emerged after Khrushchev's fall and in the strong reaction in the party apparatus and the state bureaucracy against Khrushchev's brand of innovation, risk-taking and dynamism. Such factors have tended to produce a kind of conservatism marked by a revival of ideological orthodoxy but not genuine militancy, and a politics of compromise, log-rolling, and coalition among the oligarchs. The result has been action by the

*The presidium of the CPSU Central Committee was renamed politburo at the 23rd Party Congress (29 March-8 April 1966).

SECRET

SECRET

leadership in those policy areas where its members have found common denominators among themselves on practical if not theoretical grounds, but also inaction and conspicuous stalemates in many other spheres of policy as well. This state of things and the prevailing mood of the oligarchy came under challenge during the Middle East crisis. Moscow party chief Yegorychev's apparent sally against the top leaders' handling of the crisis at the June 20-21 plenum--although a fiasco for this young militant, who was sacked for his temerity*--is a symptom of disagreement within the party over the direction and effectiveness of post-Khrushchev policy.

The obvious and most difficult question is whether the repercussions within the leadership of Israel's success will move Soviet politics off its present resting point. No direct answer can be given for the simple reason that it depends on the course of factional struggles within the leading group. It is a time when the intangibles of politics carry more weight than normally: when the persuasiveness of a leader, his ability to grasp unexpected opportunities, his skill in tactical maneuver and building a winning faction, his accumulated assets and liabilities, and his luck are thrown into the political balance. However, it is possible to some extent to discern

*On 27 June Yegorychev was replaced by Grishin, a candidate (non-voting) member of the politburo. Then on 11 July, Yegorychev's presumed patron Shelepin was demoted to the trade union chieftaincy (formerly held by Grishin). Another member of Shelepin's clique, KGB Chief Semichastnyy, had been removed on 18 May (i.e., prior to the Middle East war).

SECRET

SECRET

the outlines of the leadership conflict, the issues at hand, the policy courses that could be taken, the strengths and weaknesses of the main contenders, and where various leaders stand in terms of policy, power and influence.

PART ONE: PATTERNS OF POLITICAL ALIGNMENT IN THE POLITBURO

POWER AND POLICY ORIENTATIONS

The struggle under Khrushchev over the question of whether "politics" and "ideology" on one hand, or "economics" on the other hand, should determine policy still remains the underlying issue in the post-Khrushchev leadership. The conflict divides the members of the leading group roughly into an ideologically-oriented and an economically-oriented wing. Where Khrushchev gave the lead to "economics" over politics, the ideologically-oriented forces--the defenders of the primacy of "politics" and "ideology" in formulating the party general line--have been pre-eminent since Khrushchev's fall. However, this broad division of the leadership into two wings is quite loose, despite its usefulness. Some further sub-divisions must be distinguished if the post-Khrushchev pattern of leadership politics is to be adequately understood.

At the extreme of the ideologically-oriented side of the political spectrum are the militants who have been led by Shelepin up to now and have included such younger figures as the hapless Yegorichev. These "young turks" have fallen on bad days of late. Next in order comes a very influential, old-line conservative element best represented in the person of the ideologue Suslov. Brezhnev has deferred to this element and has himself rather consistently adhered to a conservative, ideologically-oriented position. He has been careful not to expose himself to the vulnerabilities Khrushchev assumed when he pursued policy lines which tended to alienate party conservatives and the military. On the other side of center Kosygin has represented the economics-oriented and reform-minded elements in the leadership who are more concerned with

SECRET

SECRET

the balanced growth and modernization of the national economy than with revolution abroad. The more radical Khrushchevian variant of reformism which envisaged the party rather than the government becoming the main economic manager and which promoted basic and rapid shifts in allocations favoring consumer economics has faded from the present scene. (Of course there are variations, even inconsistencies, that complicate the placement of some members of the leading group in the political spectrum. Moreover, there are a significant number of fence-straddlers.)

The caution of the leadership majority both in the Middle East crisis and in other situations is a reflection of their awareness of the realities of American power since Cuba rather than an attachment to "moderation" in policy. Excluding the militants, both the conservatives and the reform-minded members agree that this has not been a period to test the United States by force or the threat of force. Nor is the majority disposed to allow Soviet power to be drawn into a direct confrontation with the United States through the actions of its clients, as was underscored by its flat rejection of Nasser's attempt to do just this.

However, party conservatives are at serious odds with the reform-minded on what general policy line should be pursued in response to the American power advantage. For the conservative this is a time for keeping one's powder dry and a time for internal consolidation while building Soviet strength for the future. During this period the party conservatives are concerned with preventing any blurring of the hostile divide between the "enemy" and themselves. Thus, it is not a time for getting along with the United States; but neither is it a time for brinkmanship, or in Soviet parlance, "adventurism."

It is worth recalling in this connection that Molotov and even Stalin were disposed to caution. It was Khrushchev who was disposed to "adventurism." From the point of view of the party conservative, Khrushchev's risk-taking not only undermined the efficacy and credibility of Soviet policy in world politics, but in the Cuban crisis even endangered the Soviet Union itself. On the other side of the coin, Brezhnev suggested at the 23rd Congress that Khrushchev's concentration on an over-ambitious, consumer-

SECRET

SECRET

oriented domestic policy also involved another kind of adventurism--the neglect of Soviet defenses. Most relevantly to the present leadership's conduct in the recent Middle East crisis, it is worth recalling that the presidium's indictment of Khrushchev in October 1964 reportedly charged him with "dangerous rashness" in the Suez crisis of 1956 for "committing the Soviet armed forces to a possible intervention, bringing the country thus to the brink of war, without having consulted with sufficient clarity the high executive organs of the USSR." It was widely rumored at the time of Khrushchev's October 1964 central committee "trial" that Suslov had delivered the indictment. In sum, conservative principles demand that militancy be tempered by a judicious weighing of available resources and of the actual opportunities in pursuing policy goals. For the party conservative the cardinal virtues are patience and careful calculation in the struggle with the "class enemy" abroad.

The ill-fitting term "moderate" makes somewhat more sense when it is applied to the reform-minded and economics-oriented wing of the leadership. Unlike the conservatives, they see internal consolidation as a prime goal in itself dictated by pressing internal needs rather than by the demands of a long-term struggle with an increasingly aggressive imperialism. They see a policy of limited accommodation with the United States and the West as desirable not so much for its own sake, but as a condition favoring major efforts at economic reform and at overcoming imbalances in economic growth. While not renouncing support of revolution in the underdeveloped world, they balk at commitments that would involve a constant drain on resources that could be used at home, and they emphasize the line on influencing the world revolution through Soviet economic "example." Kosygin has been the leading representative of this viewpoint in the post-Khrushchev leadership. Among politburo members, he was the most explicit endorser of the "mutual concessions" theme that Khrushchev employed in 1959-1960 and subsequently used to cover his backdown in Cuba; he pressed an abortive policy of "mutual example" in reducing military costs in the months after Khrushchev's fall; he has struck optimistic notes on long-term world trends while Brezhnev has stressed the persistence of international dangers; and he clearly tends to leave more room than Brezhnev for future improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations.

SECRET

SECRET

CONSERVATISM IN THE PARTY'S GENERAL LINE

While the Kosygin-led economics-oriented wing of the leadership has not been without influence, it has had to work within the restrictive confines of a general party line which has largely been defined by the party conservatives. The latter have had the main say in framing major party pronouncements. They have established the broad context within which foreign and domestic policy is made. A pronounced conservative trend has been reflected in the editorials in the party theoretical journal Kommunist devoted to the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution and also in the central committee's anniversary "Theses."* The Theses provide a comprehensive statement of the party's current general line and give a clear expression in doctrinal formulas of the conservative platform. The Theses were approved at the June 1967 plenum of the party which dealt with the Middle East crisis. They were undoubtedly drawn up well in advance of the crisis--though they were obviously altered in places to take the crisis into account. It is still perhaps rather early to tell whether the impact of the crisis on leadership politics has been such as to produce significant shifts of line in one way or another. So far there has been no sign of new elements in regime statements since the crisis. Nevertheless, an acquaintance with the basic formulations of the Theses can provide a useful gauge against which future signs of change or continuity in line can be measured.

The central committee Theses mark the 50 years of Soviet rule with a rather somber picture of a world full of dangers. They offer little more to the Soviet citizenry than the prospect of a long and bitter struggle of indefinite duration with a wily class enemy. Gone from the Theses is any trace of the Khrushchevian theme that "Communism" is just around the corner in the USSR along with

*The pervasiveness of this trend is made further evident by the revision early this year of the Handbook for Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations. The revisions, in effect, instruct the low-level party secretaries to give first place to "ideology" and "politics" and not to production questions in their party activities. Nonetheless, the revisions call for "more effective" control over the economic apparatus in view of the freer hand "economic leaders" have been given under the 1965 economic reforms.

SECRET

SECRET

the idea that the Soviet people would be entering an era of peace and plenty by 1980. Instead, the Theses dwell on the long drawn-out nature and the complexity of the process of building Communism. Rather than tying party policy to a blueprint for the future, the Theses reflect the leadership's stress on the "immediate" and "unresolved" tasks facing the party at home and, in effect, say that there is no shortcut to Communism.

The postponement of the Communist utopia at home is implicitly but unmistakably connected in the Theses with the burdens of the class struggle abroad. According to the Theses the increased aggressiveness of imperialism the world over, American imperialism in particular, is responsible for a period of intensified international tension. The Theses do not suggest that this condition is temporary but that it arises from a fundamental historical factor--namely the sharpening of the general economic crisis of world capitalism. According to this theme, the imperialists are led to take desperate measures to prevent further deterioration of their positions. As a consequence, they pursue "adventurist" policies in world politics. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam is cited as a symptom of the crisis. While the Theses speak of imperialism's increasing inner weaknesses, the document does not suggest that the enemy has become an easy mark. Rather, according to the Theses, capitalist monopolies have united and joined their power to that of the state and have been able to mount menacing counter-attacks on the revolutionary movement at various points around the world.

On the basis of this perspective, the Theses unambiguously subordinate welfare goals to the main business of increasing the economic and military "might" of the country. The Theses reassert the line that narrowing the gap between consumer and heavy industrial production remains dependent on the preferential development of heavy industry. One of the "main conclusions" of the past 50 years, according to the Theses, is the primary importance of building Soviet military strength as a "real counter-balance" to an aggressive imperialism. Where Khrushchev

SECRET

SECRET

once emphasized building Communism at home--to such an extent that Molotov accused him of neglecting the party's world-wide revolutionary goals--the Theses stress the "indivisibility" of the party's international and national aims. Hence the Theses closely tie building Communism in the USSR with tipping the balance of forces against imperialism and providing the basis for the world-wide victory of socialism abroad.

The conservative tenor of the Theses is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in their revised formulation of the "state-of-the-whole people" (or "all peoples' state") doctrine originally introduced under Khrushchev at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961. Khrushchev intertwined that doctrine with the prospect of increasing internal relaxation and decreasing external danger as the Soviet Union moved toward Communism. At the time of the 23rd Congress last year there were clear signs that the doctrine was under critical reappraisal. It was conspicuously ignored at the congress and in the May Day slogans. The Theses now present a reformulation of the doctrine which fits in more harmoniously with the present political line.

The Khrushchevian version of the all-peoples' state was focused almost entirely on its domestic functions. The present version gives equal emphasis to the Soviet state's external and revolutionary functions. The Theses add the themes that the all-peoples' state "continues the cause" of the dictatorship of the proletariat and "wages class war" together with other socialist states against imperialism in the international arena. Thus the continuity of the doctrine of the all-peoples' state with the dictatorship of the proletariat doctrine is underscored rather than the Khrushchevian idea that the Soviet state had entered a new stage which marked the end of the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR.

The influence of Suslov's thinking in the revision is unmistakable. He was at odds with Khrushchev on the question of the Soviet state before the 22nd Congress. He had promoted the concept that the USSR and bloc functioned as a dictatorship of the proletariat for the world

SECRET

SECRET

revolutionary movement but failed to get this notion into the new Party Program at the 22nd Congress. However, he did have some success in toning down Khrushchev's line that the Soviet state was now "withering away" insofar as its internal role was concerned.* Now in the Theses Suslov seems to have gained both points. The Theses re-emphasize the Soviet state's revolutionary mission abroad and say nothing about the withering away of the state at home. Rather, the Theses stress the argument that the state must be further developed as the way to "public self-rule"--a line that bears kinship with what the Yugoslav's ridiculed as Stalin's theory of "the state that doesn't wither."

In harmony with the renewed emphasis on the external revolutionary function of the Soviet state as well as on the need for a strong state internally is a diluted neo-Stalinist formulation on the contemporary ideological struggle. (In the 1930's, Stalin introduced the thesis that the domestic class war increases in intensity as the Soviet Union proceeds toward the building of socialism. Stalin's thesis, which was used to justify his purges in the 1930's, came under harsh attack by Khrushchev in the 1956 "secret" speech and again at the 1961 Party

*At the 1961 Congress, both Suslov and Khrushchev stated that the dictatorship of the proletariat had fulfilled its mission of building "socialism," and that the proletarian dictatorship had been transformed into the "state of the whole people" whose mission was to build "Communism." But Suslov concluded (1) that state apparatus would be strengthened during the period of the "state of the whole people" and (2) that the state would create the "material and technical base of Communism." Khrushchev held (1) that the existing state apparatus would wither during the period of the state of the whole people and (2) that the party would be called upon to create the material and technical base of Communism. The party program, adopted at the 1961 Congress, reflected Suslov's more conservative conclusions on the "state of the whole people."

SECRET

SECRET

Congress by Mikoyan, a former confidant of Khrushchev's who lost his presidium membership and Supreme Soviet chairmanship in December 1965.) The Theses, asserting that the ideological struggle has become "extremely acute" in the external world, warn that the greater the successes of socialism the more insidious become the efforts of the imperialists to lure the people away from Marxism-Leninism and infect them with "bourgeois ideology." Hence the party faces a "serious" task in fighting the influence of "alien morals and traditions," and overcoming "negative manifestations in the consciousness and behavior of the people." Here, of course, is an indication of the deep disturbance within the party apparatus over Western influence in the USSR. The above formula also obviously relates to the regime's troubles with the uncowed liberal intellectuals who are seen as being corrupted by "individualism" and "apolitical attitudes."

BREZHNEV AND THE POWER STRUGGLE

Kosygin's Problems

The predominance of conservative themes in the Theses underscores once more the handicap Kosygin faces in leadership politics. At present Kosygin and his supporters do not hold the high ground which gives its occupiers the prime advantage in defining the party line. This ground of course is the CPSU central committee secretariat and is now held by Brezhnev and Suslov. The Theses were undoubtedly drafted under their direct supervision--as the contents of the document suggests. While this does not mean that Kosygin has not succeeded in having any of his positions on specific questions incorporated into party documents--for example, the Theses section on "economic reform"--it does reflect the fact that Kosygin's views have taken a distinctly secondary place. But if his views are to make real headway, command the attention of the officialdom, and be adopted in other than piecemeal fashion, he and his supporters must be in a position to shape the basic formulations of the general line as well. Such incidents as the


SECRET

SECRET

"hardening" by TASS through editorial alterations of Kosygin's statements at a 25 June 1967 press conference in New York--most likely under guidance from the secretariat--underlines his predicament.*



Brezhnev



Kosygin

*See ahead, page 42 and 43, for a discussion of the highlights of the TASS censorship of Kosygin's press conference remarks.

SECRET

SECRET

Many observers (and they may be correct) have been persuaded that Kosygin as a long-time technocrat has neither acquired the skill nor is disposed by character to alter the situation by factional political struggle and to aim at ultimately acquiring Brezhnev's job. Indeed, there have been few signs that he has been engaged in such an effort.

However, Brezhnev has often acted as if he regarded Kosygin as a competitor rather than a trusted collaborator. (Evidence for this proposition is examined at length in part two of this report.) Further, quite aside from the personal motives of Brezhnev and Kosygin, the division of executive authority between them is a source of cleavage within the leadership structure itself. Add to this the many indications that the two leaders do not see eye to eye on policy and the fact that Kosygin is a leader with his own base of power and not a dependent of Brezhnev, and the potential for conflict is intensified. Khrushchev solved the problem of shared rule by downing Malenkov, then backing Bulganin's appointment to the post, and finally taking on the post himself in addition to his party job, after Bulganin had gone over to the "anti-party" opposition in 1957. Brezhnev might be tempted to do the same, but here he would have to move carefully so as not to arouse the fear and provoke the opposition of his fellow oligarchs in the "collective leadership" against his drive for power. While it must remain conjectural, Brezhnev may have already contemplated a step in this direction last year, but then thought better of it, when rumors were circulated in Moscow on the eve of the August Supreme Soviet that Kosygin was ready to resign.*

*Rumors that Premier Kosygin is to be removed were reportedly circulating again in high government circles in Moscow, according to a late July piece of information passed through a subsorce (described as fairly reliable) from a Soviet economic official in East Berlin. According to the report, Kosygin's expected removal is due to severe differences (which the report did not elaborate upon) between Kosygin and Brezhnev occasioned by the (footnote continued on page 13)

SECRET

SECRET

The fact of the matter remains, however, that Brezhnev holds the main track in the political arena of the leadership. He has something of a strategic advantage organizationally over his actual and potential competitors. If anything, all the signs suggest that he has steadily strengthened his position, especially in view of the manifest decline of Shelepin and his entourage in the past eighteen months.

Shelepin's Unsuccessful Struggle

Up to now, at least, Brezhnev rather clearly has regarded Shelepin rather than Kosygin as a more immediate and more dangerous rival for power. Some of the major reasons for Brezhnev's judgment are quite evident. Shelepin represented a threat from within the party apparatus, not from without as is the case with Kosygin. He had emerged from Khrushchev's fall--in which he played a key role--in a position of strength second only to Brezhnev's within the party. He had a foot in both the presidium (now politburo) and the secretariat, was deputy premier


(footnote continued from page 12)
former's recent visit to the United States. Despite the fact that the sources of rumors cannot be easily pinned down, it should not be forgotten that rumor-spreading is a time-worn device in factional politics. The former Bulgarian Premier Yugov and his faction, for example, were accused by the victorious Zhivkov faction of having spread rumors of Zhivkov's impending fall at a certain juncture. It is tempting to speculate, therefore, that Shelepin's faction was behind another flurry of rumors in the summer of 1965 that Brezhnev was about to fall.

SECRET

SECRET

of the Council of Ministers and chief of the party-state control apparatus (a unique organization with a great potential for exercising power over both the officialdom of party and state) and had a protege (Semichastnyy) installed as head of the KGB as well as a coterie of followers in influential positions in the party apparatus.

Not only Brezhnev, but probably other senior leaders, saw a common danger in the youthful, militant and ambitious Shelepin. Shelepin apparently had not taken his colleagues' concern sufficiently into account and moved too quickly and boldly to gain power. During the summer of 1965, in any case, the rumors that Shelepin



Shelepin

SECRET

SECRET

was scheming and intriguing to get Brezhnev's job were followed by leadership action curbing his (Shelepin's) power. In December 1965 the party-state control agency which he had headed was abolished and by the time of the 23rd Party Congress he was deprived of a direct role in cadre appointments in the party.

The circumstantial evidence suggests that Shelepin was a principal in what was evidently a bold but abortive attack on Brezhnev's handling of the Middle East crisis at the June 1967 plenum. This affair led not only to the ouster of Shelepin's presumed ally Yegorychev as head of the Moscow party but to his own demotion to chief of the trade unions--an action that most probably portends his removal from the secretariat, and, possibly, his eventual downgrading from voting-member status on the politburo. However, the Yegorychev affair may have been less a prime cause than a pretext for Brezhnev to take one step further in his gradual effort to dispose of his adversary. Before the Middle East crisis broke Brezhnev had already succeeded in forcing Semichastnyy out as KGB chief--here Svetlana Stalin's defection came as a windfall--and moving an (apparent) ally, the party specialist in Soviet bloc affairs, Andropov, into his place. The latter action not only strengthened Brezhnev's grip on the police apparatus, but along with Andropov's elevation into the politburo as a candidate member, raised the political status of that agency to its highest point since 1953, when it suffered a major reduction of its powers after Beria's execution. Thus, in this connection, it is difficult to credit the idea offered recently by some Western analysts that Brezhnev still faces a major threat from the Shelepin forces other than perhaps in the sense that they may survive to fight another day. Rather, Brezhnev seems to have succeeded to a large degree in defusing the threat from his most dangerous challenger.

It is important to keep in mind that while there has been a distinct cleavage in the policy outlooks of Brezhnev and Kosygin, the notable aspect of the Brezhnev-Shelepin rivalry has been that both sought to occupy much the same political ground--with the difference that Shelepin

SECRET

SECRET

has taken a more clear-cut militant stand, Brezhnev a fuzzier position. In short, Shelepin has been holding out the promise to the ideologically-oriented wing of the party that he could do what Brezhnev was claiming to do with greater dynamism and efficacy. Brezhnev has repeatedly represented his policy as one which would increase the "effectiveness" of party efforts in the struggle against "imperialism" and in building economic and military strength at home--implying a contrast with the alleged ineptitude of Khrushchevian policy. Yegorychev's apparent sally against the leadership's cautious actions in the Middle East crisis--undertaken, perhaps, with Shelepin's blessing--added up to accusing Brezhnev himself of ineffectiveness, of propounding a hard line without teeth. Vulnerability to this complaint of the party militant remains a basic weakness of the kind of cautiousness Brezhnev has adopted so far. While Brezhnev nonetheless has strengthened his grip on the organizational positions in the leadership, he is undoubtedly seeking for ways of making more credible his emphasis on making party policy "effective."

With the successive defeats the Shelepin faction has suffered, Brezhnev would now seem to enjoy more elbow room and be in a better position to consolidate his conservative line. But how he shall move remains in question. Involved in the answer are both the disposition of forces with which Brezhnev must reckon within the leading group and the very difficult matter of his own motives and inclinations as a leader.

Suslov's Influence

Despite Shelepin's decline, there remains the powerful influence exercised by Suslov on the side of traditionalism. While probably not a direct contender for Brezhnev's position, he can act as a strong restraining influence on the general secretary from his position in the secretariat. While Suslov would be close to the young militants on broad ideological grounds, he probably considers them immature and adventurist as other senior leaders who also

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

may agree that they need to be held in check. On the other hand, he probably does not want them driven completely from the field, inasmuch as the young militants may be considered a useful check to Brezhnev's expansion of power. Moreover, he also stands guard against any dilution of the basic conservatism of the overall party political line. Brezhnev may also be currently held back by a purely tactical consideration--much as was Khrushchev in his struggle against Malenkov in 1954 and early 1955. To move too obviously away from this conservative-leaning stance, would inevitably make it appear as if he were "me-tooing" Kosygin. Further, the strength of conservative opinion within the party, may make it imprudent in Brezhnev's eyes to change line.

Finally, Brezhnev's rather consistent identification with the ideologically-oriented wing of the party since Khrushchev's fall may arise from personal conviction as well as from his judgment of the balance of forces within the regime. So far, at least, he has shown no sign of shifting from his positions as a result of his defeat of Shelepin and concurrent gains in organizational strength. His July 1967 speech to military graduates some two weeks after the June plenum was an emphatic restatement of his previous line. He fitted the Israeli-Arab war into the picture he has drawn of coordinated attempts by the "imperialists," especially the Americans, to regain lost positions through counter-attacks against the revolutionary movement. He rejected the notion that the crisis was the result of national strife between Israel and the Arab states. He professed to see it as another engagement in the world-wide class struggle and asserted that the "arrogance" of the imperialists required "still greater" attention to building Soviet military strength.

Brezhnev's Prospects

Brezhnev, in any case, has three broad options for his future course: (1) a turn toward a high risk militancy in foreign affairs, (2) continuing his present hard line toward the United States but avoiding brinkmanship in genuine

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

crises, and (3) seeking a more relaxed relationship with the United States and giving greater attention to internal problems.

The first course has been rejected by Brezhnev and the pressures in its favor have been reduced for now by Shelepin's steady decline. Correspondingly, movement toward the third option is now easier for Brezhnev but the fact that Kosygin has so far preempted this line acts as a deterrent as long as he remains premier. The prospect at least for the near future actually seems to favor a continuance of the second course perhaps with some veering to one side or the other. At the same time, this course leaves some room for flexibility in developing strategies for various local situations. Brezhnev has evidently been trying to develop such a strategy toward Western Europe aimed at drawing Europe away from its associations with the United States and increasing Soviet political leverage in the area. In this connection, Brezhnev has been speaking of the applicability of the peaceful coexistence concept to the European continent, despite his tendency to downplay the concept in general and in particular with regard to U.S.-Soviet relations.

Brezhnev's problem as a leader, even more so now than before, has been his difficulty in maintaining forward momentum for his foreign and domestic programs. He rode to power on the wave of reaction in the oligarchy to Khrushchevian leadership, but the time has long since past when Khrushchev provided a convenient whipping-boy. Brezhnev must take the rap when things go wrong.* It is just

*As if he were in search of a scapegoat, Brezhnev went out of his way to defend politburo policy during the Arab-Israeli war; he did not defend past Soviet policy for the Middle East in his 5 July address. In this connection--and in what appeared to be a classic KGB effort to try to shift the blame of a glaring failure from their ultimate boss, Brezhnev, to his competitor, Kosygin--a known KGB agent claimed in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war that the dismal failure of the UAR to meet Soviet expectations "may put Kosygin in a bad position." One month later the same KGB agent seemed to provide an apologia in Brezhnev's defense. The agent stated that the USSR "would prefer an Egypt which is defeated but remains a socialist country to a victorious Egypt which would become a capitalist country and no longer need Soviet aid."

-18-

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

as true of a Soviet Communist leader as other leaders--if not more so--that he must sustain the appearance of forward movement in his policy. Otherwise he can become prey to other pretenders to power around him. (Khrushchev's fall, for example, came after his own program had been foundering. His Cuban venture, two years earlier, itself was a desperate attempt to restore momentum to his leadership.) While the Middle East setback was not his "Cuba," the outcome of that war did not help Brezhnev. The problem of forward movement remains.

PART TWO: PATTERNS IN POLITBURO LEADERS' POLICY STATEMENTS

The following textual analysis of the public speeches of Soviet leaders reveals basic differences on major foreign and domestic policy issues. The analysis reveals a remarkable degree of consistency in the individual treatment of major issues by the leaders. Patterns emerge which permit the identification of distinct policy preferences of the individual Soviet policy-maker, which, in turn, throws light on Kremlin policy cleavages. (The patterns also serve a vital political function within the Soviet power environment--that is, the communication of an individual leader's line to the lower-ranking party and government members.)

It is apparent that, as in the past, speeches are frequently subjected to coordination by members of the politburo. The early November revolution anniversary addresses appear to be heavily coordinated. But other speeches, in particular the annual election speeches for the Supreme Soviet (parliament) speeches at the party congresses and plenums and at Supreme Soviet sessions display considerably divergent formulations on various issues. And on the whole, the conscious effort at presenting a coordinated line makes the differences that do appear the more noticeable.

SECRET

SECRET

The following section, which concentrates primarily on policy issues--rather than on political alignments per se--examines the patterns derived from the politburo leaders' remarks since the fall of Khrushchev.

BREZHNEV: HOSTILITY ABROAD, DISCIPLINE AT HOME

From the outset of his incumbency Brezhnev has developed his policy lines around the theme that the Soviet Union must face a world full of dangers for an indefinite future. He thus has tacitly but unmistakably dissociated himself from Khrushchev's optimistic themes of a steady, if uneven, trend of declining danger of war and the prospect of "removing war from the life of society." Brezhnev has sought to give new life to the sense of external danger which has animated Soviet politics but which was dulled by Khrushchevian doctrines. While not going so far as to renounce Khrushchev's pronouncement that the "capitalist encirclement" of the USSR has ended, he has sought to provide something of a functional equivalent of that discarded doctrine by stressing that the Soviet Union remains in "a hostile capitalist environment."

Where Khrushchev turned the party toward internal ideological goals focussing the new party program more on building Communism at home than on revolution abroad, Brezhnev so far has chosen a more traditional course. He has tried to draw the party's attention back towards its external ideological purposes--toward the "anti-imperialist struggle," to restoring unity in the Communist movement and among bloc states. Correspondingly, he stresses the primary need to develop the economic and defensive "might" of the Soviet Union in order to cope with the "world-wide aggressiveness" of imperialism, especially of the United States.

SECRET

SECRET

A. The Hard Line Toward the United States

Unlike Kosygin, Brezhnev pictures the Vietnam war as only one of many obstacles blocking any substantial improvement of relations with the United States. In his various speeches he has presented the Vietnam war as a symptom rather than a cause of what he regards as a historical period of "danger" and "complications" in international affairs. The underlying cause in Brezhnev's view is U.S. "imperialism" which he pictures as being on the offensive in various parts of the world. The recent Arab-Israeli war is seen simply as another front in the current imperialist offensive. In short, Brezhnev has taken radically different situations and made them fit into his simplistic conception of an imperialist master plan.

Brezhnev has displayed a consistent tendency to minimize prospects for improving relations with the United States. This tendency was evident even prior to the stepped up American involvement in Vietnam in early 1965. Within three weeks of Khrushchev's political demise, Brezhnev devalued the coexistence theme. The peaceful coexistence line so heavily stressed and singled out by his predecessor now appeared far down the list on a six-point foreign policy formula which subordinated coexistence to other Soviet external goals. This major change was introduced under the guise of continuity, but it involved a significant reshuffling of priorities in policy in which the themes of anti-imperialist struggle and national liberation rose while the theme of preventing a world war fell. Brezhnev called for:

guaranteeing peaceful conditions for constructing socialism and communism, for strengthening the unity and cohesion of the socialist countries, their friendship and brotherhood; a course directed towards support of revolutionary liberation movements, toward every possible development of solidarity and cooperation with the independent states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, toward affirmation of the principles of peaceful coexistence with capitalist states, toward the deliverance of mankind from world war.

SECRET

SECRET

Brezhnev's six-point "general course" of Soviet foreign policy was repeated almost verbatim two-and-one-half years later in the CPSU central committee Theses on the 50th anniversary of the Communist revolution.

A notable omission from Brezhnev's formulations on Soviet foreign policy has been any assertion of the Khrushchevian corollary that the policy of coexistence involved mutual concessions. Rather, Brezhnev has been disposed to give the doctrine of coexistence a militant cast. And in December 1964 he began to redefine the theme of coexistence in a defensive, negative form: "Just because we are convinced supporters of peaceful coexistence, we resolutely and implacably speak out against those who want to violate this peaceful coexistence. We give a rebuff to the provocations of the imperialists and to their encroachments on the peaceful life of the peoples of the socialist countries, on the freedom and independence of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America." The tone of militancy was present in his first major foreign policy speech (6 November 1964); he stressed that "in implementing the policy of peaceful coexistence we base ourselves on the might of the countries of the socialist camp." He combined this statement with the assertion that "we shall maintain our defense potential on the highest possible level"--the strongest presidium-level pledge for support to the Soviet military during 1964. These statements set the pattern for Brezhnev's position on foreign policy right up to the present.

Renewed Emphasis On The World Revolution

Brezhnev's upgrading of the line on supporting national liberation movements was combined with his failure to mention Khrushchev's strictures against attempts to export revolution.* Within a month of his assumption

*This line has not disappeared entirely. It has appeared in the key "consensus" speeches, that is, in Polyanskiy's 6 November 1965 revolutionary anniversary speech (in the wake of the abortive Indonesian coup) and Pelshe's 6 November 1966 speech on the same occasion.

SECRET

SECRET

of power, he followed up his formulations with actions which clearly portended a deterioration of relations with the United States. And during this period he sounded the call for a "single anti-imperialist front" to counter what he said were U.S. "encroachments" on socialist states and underdeveloped states in Asia, Africa and Latin America. (3 December 1964 Kremlin speech)

The most obvious move in this direction at the time was Moscow's decision to send military support to the Congolese rebels allegedly in response to the U.S.-Belgium rescue effort at Stanleyville (now Kisangani) in late November 1964. The only generally comparable previous Soviet move to directly aid indigenous forces came during the 1960-1962 phase of Khrushchevian bellicosity toward the West when military equipment was sent to combatants in Laos. The aid to the Congolese rebels was accompanied by a vitriolic anti-U.S. propaganda attack as well as by Soviet-staged demonstrations at the U.S. embassy in Moscow. In his 3 December speech Brezhnev made the first presidium-level attack by the post-Khrushchev leadership against the Johnson Administration. Brezhnev charged that "the bloody slaughter perpetrated in Congolese towns by the Belgian paratroops, brought in U.S. aircraft with the blessing of the White House and with the approval of the NATO Council, is a striking example of the collective piracy by the colonialists." He went on to allude to Soviet armed support of Africans, who, he said, were no longer "unarmed" in the face of the imperialists.

An emerging divergence between Brezhnev and Kosygin on the question of world revolution was reflected in Kosygin's comments in late 1964 on the Congo crisis. In his comprehensive discussion of Soviet foreign policy at the Supreme Soviet on 9 December 1964, Kosygin, unlike Brezhnev, made no allusions to strengthening the Congolese rebels and claimed only that the "world"--rather than the USSR in particular--was "profoundly indignant" over the actions of "certain [unnamed] Western powers." (This was the same speech in which Kosygin called for a policy of mutual example between the United States and the Soviet Union in reducing military budgets.)

SECRET

SECRET

That these early differences were not merely tied to a specific situation but entailed distinct outlooks was underscored at the 23rd Party Congress in 1966.* Kosygin assumed a more pragmatic, Brezhnev a more orthodox position regarding the goal of world revolution. Kosygin cited Lenin as authority for the statement that the Soviet Union "exercises its chief influence on world revolution through its economic policy," and he predicted that success in the 1966-70 economic plan would "secure further changes on the world scene in favor of peace and socialism" and would "unquestionably exert a far-reaching influence on the world situation." Diverging from Kosygin's emphasis on winning the world by "example," Brezhnev's Congress report did not refer to Soviet economic policy as the "chief" or basic contribution to world revolution. Rather, Brezhnev forecast that success in the 1966-70 economic plan would serve to "consolidate the unity of the world socialist system," would increase the Soviet Union's economic and defense might and, lastly, would bolster its international prestige.

The Congo crisis was not, of course, the only situation Brezhnev exploited to justify his developing hard line toward the United States during the first months of his leadership. (But that matter, like U.S. actions in the Dominican Republic beginning in April 1965, was used as an element in Brezhnev's portrayal of U.S. aggressiveness on all fronts.) Of course, the issue of Vietnam was soon to become another example cited by Brezhnev in support of his hard line toward the United States.

Characteristically, it was Brezhnev who initiated the post-Khrushchev condemnation of U.S. actions in North and South Vietnam (6 November 1964 speech) and who first spoke of Soviet readiness to extend military aid to North Vietnam (3 December 1964 speech)--well in advance of the

*For a good examination of this issue at the 23rd Party Congress see "Conflict and Consensus in the Soviet Leadership" (Soviet Division, OCI, memorandum of 27 February 1967)

SECRET

SECRET

actual intensification of the Vietnam war in February 1965. (The contrasts between Brezhnev and Kosygin on Vietnamese-related issues will be discussed in the section dealing with Kosygin's policy positions.)

Renewed Emphasis On The U.S. "Threat" in Europe

Brezhnev, however, has not treated Vietnam as the central issue for Soviet foreign policy. He has given particular attention to U.S. military activity and supposed intentions in Europe--rather than dwelling on U.S. activity in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. He has drummed up a picture of a "serious threat" to both Soviet and general European interests raised by U.S. collusion with West German "revanchism." This line seems to be intended to advance four goals of Soviet policy emphasized by Brezhnev: (1) removing the U.S. presence from Western Europe, (2) fragmenting NATO, (3) strengthening the Soviet position and influence in the Warsaw grouping, and (4) expanding CPSU influence through the agency of local parties in West European politics.

In an effort to justify these objectives in doctrinal terms, Brezhnev has introduced a novel amendment to Khrushchev's doctrine of peaceful coexistence. Brezhnev has pushed the coexistence line with regard to Western Europe--and only Western Europe--in order to "prove" that there is no need for NATO.

Removing The U.S. Presence From Western Europe:
Thus, Brezhnev in his 1967 election speech stressed that:

In its relations with the capitalist countries of Europe, the Soviet Union steadfastly follows the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

He did not, however, apply the notion to U.S.-Soviet relations. To the same effect, Brezhnev's single reference to peaceful coexistence in his 24 April 1967 Karlov

SECRET

SECRET

Vary (Czechoslovakia) speech was made in one of his interlaced arguments for the removal of the U.S. military presence and U.S. political and economic influence in Europe. Among the arguments were, for example, that the U.S. had "fabricated the myth" of Communist aggression in order to impose its will on West European governments through the NATO pact; that the "over 300 billion dollars" the European states belonging to NATO had spent on military preparations had slowed down their economic, scientific and cultural progress; that the "brain drain" of West European scientists to the U.S. was a conscious American policy; that the large areas used to quarter U.S. forces imposed a burden on the West European populace; that the U.S. had tried to poison relations between East and West Europe by building "subversive espionage and sabotage centers and broadcasting stations"; and that the U.S. presence in Europe encouraged West German "militarism" and threatened peace in Europe.

Brezhnev set forth the rationale for concentrating on Europe in his April 1967 Karlovy Vary speech. After pointing out that the United States had been unsuccessful in its "stubborn efforts" to involve its NATO allies in the Vietnam war "as occurred during the Korean war," Brezhnev argued that "tying down the forces of imperialism in Europe" limits the scope and hampers the success of capitalist ambitions on "all other continents." On the surface, Brezhnev's rationale is inconsistent, inasmuch as it appeals for the removal of the U.S. presence in Europe but goes on to imply that the military status quo in Europe works not only to the advantage of the North Vietnamese party but also to the advantage of the CPSU. However, the stress on the U.S.-West German "threat" in Europe provides both a pretext for Moscow's limited activity in Vietnam and a counter to Chinese Communist charges that the Soviets are planning to pull back from, rather than open up, a "second front" in Europe.

The "threat" in Europe also harmonizes with the priority Brezhnev has given to strengthening Soviet leadership in East Europe. Secondly, Brezhnev has used the theme of war danger in Europe to persuade the West Europeans of the danger of a continued U.S. presence in Europe and of the desirability of a Europe detached from American--but not Soviet--influence.

SECRET

SECRET

Strengthen The Soviet Bloc, Fragment NATO: Trying to have it both ways, Brezhnev has drummed up fears to keep the Warsaw pact consolidated while extending inducements to wean the West Europeans away from America. Clearly, the most important goal for Brezhnev is that of assuring national and bloc unity; the less important, gaining substantial cooperation with the capitalist countries of Europe. In his 1967 election speech he defined the objectives of the Soviet Union's European policy as follows:

First, to consolidate and to strengthen the gains of the peoples achieved as the result of the most cruel war in the history of mankind and of the radical class social changes in Europe which followed it; second, to isolate the forces of imperialist aggression, not to allow the West German militarists and revanchists to unbridle themselves, and above all to prevent them from gaining access to nuclear weapons; on that basis to strengthen the security of our western borders and the borders of the socialist countries allied with us, and to create the conditions for broad and fruitful cooperation in Europe of countries with different social systems.

Brezhnev's formulations on this theme are a mixture of old Stalinist themes and more recent detente themes. Thus on the one hand, he calls for unrealistic, extreme preconditions for European security which subordinate constructive moves toward meaningful European detente to the consolidation of the Soviet bloc. For example, he called for the dissolution of NATO by its 1969 renewal date and other one-sided propagandistic demands, such as the liquidation of military bases and the removal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean. On the other hand, he dangled before the West Europeans attractive--and double-edged--"detente" proposals, such as the construction of

SECRET

SECRET

a natural gas pipeline from the USSR to Western Europe.* The gas pipeline, argued Brezhnev on 24 April, would be one measure leading to the "liberation" of Europe from the U.S. "dollar diktat." Notable among Brezhnev's other bids were general proposals for cooperation in the fields of economy, science, technology and culture on both a bilateral and an all-European basis, and specific proposals for the establishment of a unified color television system for Europe, cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy, and joint activity in river and sea purification and disease eradication.

Expanding Communist Influence in West European Politics: The Karlovy Vary conference of the European parties also marked an intensified effort on Brezhnev's part to increase CPSU influence in European politics through the agency of local parties. Brezhnev spoke of the growing role of the West European Communist parties in the recent period and implicitly claimed credit for the increasing influence of those parties during his incumbency. Thus he stressed that "the past few years have shown quite clearly that in conditions of slackened international tension the pointer of the political barometer moves left." This period of leftist progress was implicitly set off against the record under Khrushchev. Alluding to his predecessor's rocket-rattling and associated threats over Germany and Berlin, Brezhnev stated that the atmosphere of military threats had been counterproductive.

*The pipeline project had been [] discussed with Austrian and Finnish officials as early as 1964. With the 1966 announcement of the end of the NATO embargo on wide-diameter pipe to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe the proposal was publicly aired by Supreme Soviet leader Podgornyy with the Austrians in November 1966 and the Italians in January, at which time Podgornyy said talks were "underway" to construct a pipeline to provide natural gas to Italy.

SECRET

SECRET

for the West European Communist movement.* He went on to conclude that during the present period (which in this context he portrays as a quiet period) Communist party influence had increased correspondingly:

Certain changes in relations between communists and social democrats in certain countries, a noticeable falling off in anticommunist hysteria, and the increase in the influence of West European Communist parties is most directly correlated with the reduction in tension which has taken place in Europe.

On the matter of working with social democratic parties, Brezhnev's remarks contained cautious currents --in this particular case, endorsing in principle Communist party cooperation with the social democrats and then undercutting that call with sharp attacks on the two major West European social democratic organizations. Thus he went out of his way, as he has done in the past two years, to score the British Labor Party and the West German SPD--two major West European parties which, in Brezhnev's lights had shown themselves unwilling to "march with us."

*Accordingly, Brezhnev did not comment on the need for a German peace settlement (a call also deleted in the CPSU's 1967 May Day slogans), though he repeated the remaining six points of the European security program approved at the July 1966 Bucharest meeting of the Political Consultative Council of the Warsaw Pact (develop intra-European relations, liquidate NATO and then the Warsaw Pact, adopt several partial disarmament measures, prevent the possibility of West German nuclear armament, recognize Europe's postwar frontiers, call a conference on European security). In his Karlovy Vary speech, Brezhnev called only for the "recognition of the existence of two German states" rather than diplomatic recognition of East Germany per se--as GDR leader Ulbricht insists.

SECRET

SECRET

Brezhnev's repeated critical comments on the two major socialist parties in Europe have closely conformed to the early post-WWII Cominform line on the European social democratic parties introduced in late September 1947 by Zhdanov--a Stalinist henchman praised by Brezhnev in a Leningrad speech on 10 July 1964 as "an outstanding politician and statesman." Paraphrasing Zhdanov's pejorative comments on the West German social democrats, Brezhnev in Bucharest in the latter part of July 1965 reportedly stated in private that the Soviet Union had no confidence in the leadership of the SPD because the Socialist International, of which the SPD is a member, is "a headquarters of the struggle against the socialist camp in the capitalist world." In his 29 March 1966 report to the central committee at the 23rd CPSU Congress Brezhnev, without elaboration, charged that difficulties encountered in the Communists' struggle for unity with working class movements are due "above all to the right-wing leaders of the social democratic parties." Brezhnev scored the SPD's role in the Bonn coalition government in his 1967 March election speech by seizing a quite routine matter; he told Moscow electors on 10 March that "although social democrats now hold a number of ministerial positions in Bonn, the new government has already found time to announce its intention to continue the ban of the party of the German working class"--the KPD-Communist Party of Germany.* The KPD ban was also mentioned in his next two major speeches which, in citing other spurious examples, served to expand his attacks on the SPD. In East Berlin on 18 April Brezhnev said that the SPD, the party "that calls itself the party of the working people

*This routine announcement, which has almost always been ignored in comments by Soviet leaders, was alluded to by FRG Chancellor Kiesinger in a 3 March interview with Neue Revue, and the Chancellor, who reportedly expressed his "fundamental skepticism" about a ban on extremist political parties in general, went out of his way to state that the KPD could again be legalized when the topic of reunification "enters an acute stage."

SECRET

SECRET

of West Germany," had "in no way" effected a change from the FRG's "aims of revenge and war preparations to aims of peaceful cooperation and...European security." And in his 24 April Karlovy Vary speech, he attacked the SPD for refusing to adopt an independent foreign policy and for following "in the wake of the CDU, the party of the German monopolies." Brezhnev also derided the British Labor Party, the "prime example," he said, "of a party betraying the working class" for its support for NATO.*

Brezhnev topped his call for (limited) united tactics with an appeal for a novel propaganda forum--"a congress of the peoples of Europe on the broadest possible basis"--to discuss problems of peace and European security. Brezhnev's "people's congress" call explicitly excluded U.S. participation--an exclusion only implied in Brezhnev's 29 March 1966 CPSU Congress call for a "general European conference" on European security.** Kosygin's past remarks

*Kosygin has criticized [redacted] the British Labor Party leadership. In [redacted]

[redacted] 1965 Kosygin criticized Prime Minister Wilson for being "more American than the Americans" on the Vietnam and NATO nuclear-sharing issues. But he reportedly went on to stress that "it must, after all, be possible for the Communist and social democratic movements to find certain common views."

**Without naming the participants in his 1966 Congress report Brezhnev expressed the need to "initiate talks on European security; discuss the proposals of socialist and other European countries on a relaxation of military tension and a reduction of armaments in Europe and the development of peaceful, mutually advantageous relations between all European countries; convene an appropriate international conference for this purpose; and continue to look for ways of settling one of the cardinal problems of European security, that is, a peaceful settlement of the German problem by recognizing the now existing borders of the European countries, including those of the two German states, in order to completely remove the vestiges of World War II in Europe." Deleting the "cardinal problem" of Germany, the Karlovy Vary communique merely supported "the idea of convening a conference of all European states to study problems of security and the development of European cooperation, as well as other initiatives toward the same purpose."

SECRET

SECRET

on the Brezhnev-proposed European security conference have, in fact, reflected a more realistic effort aimed at actually negotiating East-West problems in Europe-- rather than engaging in an anti-American propaganda forum, such as Brezhnev's "peoples' conference." Thus, reflecting a high degree of seriousness underlying the idea of a security conference, Kosygin [] [] [] made the first specific suggestions for the time and means of organizing the conference. He said that the conference should be held in 1968 and that a "preparatory commission" should commence working "at once." Finally, while his statements on West European policy (discussed presently) display the desire to increase Soviet influence there, they are generally not cast in the hostile form used by Brezhnev in his arguments on the need to diminish U.S. economic influence and to cripple NATO's military capabilities.

B. Defense And Vigilance At Home

As in the case of his foreign policy formulations, Brezhnev has stayed close to the conservative lines set in his early pronouncements on domestic economic policy. And his pronouncements, reflecting his views on external conditions, have consistently favored (1) the defense and heavy industry sector and (2) the agricultural sector. Other sectors--and in particular the consumer-related sector of the Soviet economy--are subordinated.

Brezhnev's traditionalist formulation on the "prime task" of Soviet resource allocation policy was made in his first public address as CPSU First Secretary (now General Secretary): Brezhnev called for strengthening the country's defenses and stated that

SECRET

SECRET

in the sphere of domestic policy the party regards it as its prime task to develop the productive forces of our society, to raise steadily on this basis the welfare of the Soviet people, to develop socialist democracy in every way.*

Brezhnev's formulation in this speech (19 October 1964) was an accurate preview of the February 1966 directive on the "main tasks" of the five-year plan which were justified, in large part, by an alleged necessity to react to the increased "aggressive" activity of American "imperialism." Thus with a similar conclusion, the current five-year plan directive--after claiming that the Soviet Union is required to strengthen its defense might in the next five years due to the "aggravation of international tension caused by American imperialism which unleashed military aggression in various regions of the world"--presents the development of the productive forces as the "main tasks" and "thanks to this [the development of the productive forces], the achievement of a substantial rise in the living standards of the people." (A similar formula was incorporated into the 1967 Theses.)

The second main part of Brezhnev's economic program--major allocations for the agricultural sector--was previewed in his 20 November 1964 Tashkent speech in which he argued for strengthening Soviet defenses, "our national and international duty," and for increasing at the same time Soviet agricultural productivity, "our paramount and nationwide task." The two tasks were not regarded by Brezhnev as being mutually exclusive, in the sense that the funds for Brezhnev's subsequent grandiose agriculture plan announced in March 1965 were not to be taken out of the military budget. In fact, in his 27 March 1965 central committee speech which introduced his plan to invest 71 billion rubles in state and collective farms, Brezhnev completely ignored the subject of military allocations.

*Emphasis supplied here and elsewhere in this study, unless otherwise noted.

SECRET

SECRET

More recently, Brezhnev's bias in favor of the "productive forces" sector was prominent in his 1967 election speech. Here he called for "the strengthening of the economic and defensive might of the socialist motherland, for [note the order] the growth of the people's welfare and culture, and for durable peace the world over." While he stated that "improving the life of our people" is the "main aim of the policies of the Communist party," his formulation on the attainment of that main aim included prerequisites--such as success in agriculture and industry--which placed any significant increase in the standard of living in the future.* (It should be noted here, however, that the rate of growth of consumer production has increased somewhat during the post-Khrushchev leadership period.) And warning against complacency with regard to defense matters, he said in his 5 July 1967 speech (his first public address following the Israeli victory) that "defense is in the forefront of all our work." Thus his recent remarks sustain his two 1966 election pledges that (1) Soviet defenses "will be maintained at the very highest level...and will continue to preserve the superiority of our army" and (2) that "the priority development of heavy industry is the unchangeable principle of our economy." Reinforcing his traditionalist economic position, Brezhnev has not recently reiterated the 23rd CPSU Party Congress call for bringing together the rates of growth in the heavy and light industry sectors of the economy. (On the other hand, politburo leaders who echo Kosygin's economic views have recently reiterated the congress' line on proportional growth.)

While in the past two years Brezhnev has discussed the need for material incentives in the pursuit of Soviet national economic policy, he (like Podgornyy) has given noticeable stress to "moral" incentives--that is, the effort

*Certain other politburo members (such as Kirilenko, see page 83) have recently argued that present economic conditions permit a significant increase in the standard of living "now."

SECRET

SECRET

to imbue the workers with party-approved attitudes.* For example, in his 10 June 1966 election speech he called for "selfless work" in building Communism and equated that call with a World War Two political officer's slogan: "Communists, forward." In his 1967 election speech he said that this year's slogans are "shock labor in the jubilee year...not a single man lagging behind but at your side!" And he summed up his hackneyed sloganeering on incentives, as well as his overall foreign and internal views, in one concise statement:

Great persistent work and daily conquests on the labor front in combination with constant vigilance regarding the intrigues of the imperialists--this is the only key to a shining Communist tomorrow toward which our people are moving confidently under the leadership of their Leninist party.

*Kosygin, on the other hand, has given particular emphasis to the extension of material incentives through capital construction (though he has also mentioned the need for educational and cultural facilities which, presumably, serve to imbue the workers with party-approved attitudes). Interestingly, those who favor material incentives over moral incentives have come under attack. For example, Stalin's former chief theoretician Chesnokov wrote in Pravda on 27 February 1967 that "the disregard of some leaders for cultural-educational work and the broadening of the material and technical base of culture, as well as attempts to set off economic building against cultural building, can only be explained by political naivete or ignorance. Quite recently voices were heard in some places demanding that the construction of clubs and other cultural and enlightenment institutions be curtailed under the pretext of 'concern' for economic construction. Such a vulgarized approach to cultural construction violates correct Marxist understanding and the solution of the problem of balancing material and spiritual culture in the development of society."

SECRET

SECRET

Preserve The "Leading" Role of the Party: Unlike his 1966 campaign performance, Brezhnev in his election speech this year did not discuss the party as a "productive" force in the life of the nation. Rather, he fell back on the more traditionalist view that the party "leads," "guides" and "organizes" the nation's productive forces. Last June, in the context of calling for a new Soviet constitution to "crown the majestic half century of Soviet power" (a project to which he has not since publicly referred) he discussed the productive economic tasks of rank and file party workers. He said in the 1966 campaign that the party is called upon to "formulate the basis of the country's economic policy, the main principles and methods of management and to put these into practice."* Brezhnev's revived emphasis on the traditionalist role of the party also occurs at a time when Soviet media have been sharply attacking developments in both the Chinese and Yugoslav parties for departing from "sound principles" and following policies which allegedly debilitate the party's leadership over the society.

KOSYGIN: COOPERATION ABROAD, REFORM AT HOME

The keynote of Kosygin's more optimistic foreign policy outlook was sounded in the introductory passages of his 6 March 1967 election speech. In evident rebuttal of Brezhnev, Kosygin explicitly placed troubles with the capitalists in the "contemporary international atmosphere" and looked to the "future [which] will bring a considerable relaxation of international tension" and will create conditions, he said, for the Communist tomorrow. Kosygin

*As the spokesman for the politburo's coordinated line on the occasion of the last revolution anniversary celebration (6 November 1966) Pelshe cited Brezhnev's 1966 party congress remark that the party "organizes and inspires" the people--rather than citing Brezhnev's less traditional 1966 election comment that the party puts economic policy "into practice."

SECRET

SECRET

went on to emphasize that relaxation of international tension is a "principle," not a tactic or diplomatic game:

Our party and government, in their foreign political activity, have always proceeded and continue to proceed from a concern for strengthening peace and creating the conditions for peaceful socialist and Communist construction. We do not regard the search for ways to strengthen the security of the peoples as questions of tactics and diplomatic maneuverings. For us this is a line of principle, corresponding to the desires of hundreds of millions of people who hope that the future will bring a considerable relaxation of international tension.

Thus Kosygin has persisted in the optimistic foreign outlook mirrored in his 3 August 1966 Supreme Soviet report --that is, that Soviet foreign policy "takes into account the broad perspective of international development." Unlike Brezhnev's projections which magnify present troubles, Kosygin's forecasts have, in the main, looked beyond contemporary conflicts and have generally been capped with optimistic, pacific conclusions. Kosygin told Supreme Soviet delegates in August 1966 that

to orientate correctly in policy means not to shut oneself up in present-day events, but to see the main trends of long-term significance. If we look at things broadly, we shall see that these tendencies, despite the present tension caused by imperialist aggression, are favorable for the forces coming out for peace and international security.

A. Improving Relations With the United States

The Vietnam war has been the central problem for Kosygin's line on foreign policy in general, and relations with the United States in particular. The implementation of his major foreign and domestic policy goals have suffered reversals which have coincided with the intensification of the Vietnam conflict. These goals, such as a

SECRET

SECRET

reduction in the Soviet military's share of the budget and an expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade, which he outlined during his first months as premier have been sidetracked.

Vietnam: Kosygin's Obstacle, Brezhnev's Opportunity

During the months prior to February 1965 and the bombing of North Vietnam, subtle differences between Brezhnev and Kosygin were reflected in their public remarks on Vietnam. Kosygin's more circumspect statements fitted his detente-oriented outlook, Brezhnev's, his consistently harsh view of the United States. For example, with North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong on the platform, Brezhnev in his 6 November 1964 revolution anniversary speech initiated the new Soviet leadership's condemnation of the "intervention of American imperialism" in South Vietnam. Apparently with the early August and mid-September 1964 U.S. retaliatory strikes on North Vietnam in mind, he charged that "we resolutely condemn the provocations against the DRV." In his first public remarks on foreign policy after Brezhnev's attacks, Kosygin (in his 25 November anniversary speech in Ashkhabad) did not even mention North Vietnam and the acts of unnamed "imperialists" in South Vietnam were briefly passed over. Kosygin's reticence was particularly noticeable in light of the facts (1) that Moscow-Hanoi relations had greatly improved in the wake of Pham Van Dong's return from the early November visit,* and (2) that Soviet conventional air defense materiel

*Soon after Pham Van Dong's return from Moscow, an article by a DRV spokesman who had consistently engaged in anti-Soviet polemics was suddenly deleted from the November issue of the DRV party's theoretical journal (Hoc Tap), the title of the contents page was inked over, and a loose insert of a nonpolemical speech by a North Vietnamese politburo member was added. And the DRV's subsequent lack of criticism of the Soviet party stood in sharp contrast to Hanoi's unfriendly actions prior to the Soviet leadership changes, e.g., non-technical Russian newspapers and periodicals were reportedly withdrawn from circulation in the DRV and students returning from Moscow were being given political re-education courses.

SECRET

SECRET

had arrived in Vietnam in either late December or early January. In short, it is probable that the Soviet decision to reverse, at least tentatively, Khrushchev's 1963-1964 withholding of significant Soviet military support to the DRV was taken in early November, and that the decision had not evoked Kosygin's public endorsement as of late November 1964.

Contrasting comments by Kosygin and Brezhnev in December 1964 tend to strengthen this conclusion. Kosygin in his 9 December speech based his formula for a military budget cut on a "certain change for the better" in relations with the United States and pointed in this context to a U.S. pledge to reduce military outlays. Less than one week earlier (3 December) Brezhnev was emphasizing the worsening of U.S.-Soviet relations on the basis of U.S. military actions in Vietnam. Brezhnev pointedly threatened to render military assistance to the DRV on the basis of what "U.S. military aircraft and naval vessels" had already done in early August and mid-September. Kosygin's line on aiding the DRV, on the other hand, was made conditional on what unspecified "aggressors" might do.

Brezhnev's 3 December 1964
Kremlin speech

Recently DRV territory was again subjected to raids and bombardment by U.S. military aircraft and naval vessels. These acts of aggression cause indignation throughout the world. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we have already declared for all to hear that the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to the fate of a fraternal socialist country, and that it is ready to render the necessary aid to it.

Kosygin's 9 December 1964
Supreme Soviet Speech

The Soviet Government is attentively watching developments in the Caribbean, in southeast Asia, and other parts of the world. After all, the actions of aggressive imperialist circles are exacerbating the situation. The Soviet Union states that it will not remain indifferent to the destinies of such fraternal socialist countries as the DRV and the Cuban Republic, and is ready to render them necessary aid should the aggressors dare to raise a hand against them.

SECRET

SECRET

Kosygin's initial line on "rendering necessary aid" to the DRV--his sole reference to that country in his lengthy speech--was also diluted by including Cuba in the same formula. Brezhnev capped his anti-U.S. remarks with a warning that the policy of peaceful coexistence does not prevent the Soviet Union from "giving a rebuff" to those who interfere in the affairs of bloc nations, and in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Kosygin's remarks on imperialist aggressiveness, however, followed a passage urging a "considerable increase" in East-West trade, as well as an optimistic passage on prospects for improved Washington-Moscow relations.

Kosygin did not lend his full endorsement to DRV defense aid until February 1965. And at that time, he apparently linked Soviet military support with a negotiations effort that failed in the following month.* Then for several months in his numerous speeches he tended (unlike Brezhnev) to confine the scene of U.S. "aggressiveness" to Southeast Asia.

While continuing to stress that Vietnam was the obstacle to improved relations with the United States, Kosygin in May 1965 gradually began to expand his view of the supposed scope of U.S. "imperialism" and to switch

*It has been plausibly concluded that the Soviets were attempting (successfully) to increase their influence in Hanoi by granting military support while simultaneously urging negotiations on the Vietnam war, apparently because the DRV had been considering the possibility that the U.S. might be willing to use a conference as a cover for U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam. The sustained U.S. bombing in the north shattered Hanoi's and Moscow's illusions regarding the degree of U.S. resolve.

-40-

SECRET

SECRET

temporarily to the Brezhnev rationale for strengthening Soviet defenses.* His gradual--and temporary--backing away in the summer of 1965 from his own version of detente abroad and concentration on civilian economics at home may well have reflected a tentative compromise aimed at preventing a rout--such as the defeat of his economic reform plan (adopted in September amid rumors of his imminent retirement). Nevertheless, Kosygin refrained during this period from emphasizing the threat from the U.S. in Europe.** The exception to this general pattern appeared in Kosygin's atypical remarks in a 6 December 1965 interview with New York Times columnist James Reston. It should be pointed out, however, that Reston apparently provoked Kosygin with some rather blunt badgering into a bellicose position on several issues. (Thus the interview may be a less useful source for the purpose of comparing statements than are speeches written by Kosygin or his staff.) At any rate, during the interview Kosygin argued that the increase in the Soviet military budget (announced the next day) was in reaction to U.S. intentions in Europe and nuclear sharing proposals for NATO. In his next comment in the interview, Kosygin forecast that "the next few years will set the pattern for the next 10 to 15 years. One prospect is for the arms race and the increase in

*Prior to this period, the signs of political pressure on Kosygin were evident in two political slights to which he was subjected. Publication of his 19 March 1965 Gosplan speech (discussed presently) was delayed until April and then carried in the small circulation journal, Planned Economy, rather than in the larger circulation press. Secondly, a proposed April trip to Poland was, according to the Soviet press in March, to be led jointly by Brezhnev and Kosygin; in April the same media announced that Brezhnev led the delegation and gave him the overwhelming attention while slighting Kosygin on several points of protocol.

**For example, only in one speech in 1965, and then in passing, did he note that the U.S. was in Europe in a military capacity--7 May speech in East Berlin.

SECRET

SECRET

military budgets." He did not comment on any other prospect. Thus, Kosygin at that time appeared to have retreated from his December 1964 positions.

His retreat was shortlived, for in early 1966 he began again to speak of the Vietnam war as the sole obstacle in the way of improved relations with the United States. In his 3 August Supreme Soviet speech last year he based the increase in the Soviet military budget (which he described as "immense...it weighs heavily on the working people") solely on one specific situation--the Vietnam war. And while he scored U.S. "interference in the internal affairs of other nations," he did not follow Brezhnev's practice of elaborating upon such charges (such as U.S. support for Bonn "revanchists," etc.) and using such specific charges as the bases for increased Soviet defense spending. In fact, Kosygin went out of his way to acknowledge the presence of "sounder tendencies in Washington." He said he looked forward to the time when "sounder tendencies" would predominate over the "present... aggressive moods."

Kosygin's characteristic position on substantial cooperation after Vietnam was most recently renewed in response to a question posed during his 25 June 1967 news conference at the United Nations. He said that

the cause of the improvement of Soviet-American relations could best be served by one first step and that is an end to the American aggression in Vietnam and to improve those relations it is necessary first and foremost to end that war and then several--quite a big group of questions and steps could be charted which could all be designed to improve those relations and these questions could be the improvement of economic ties, cultural ties, technological exchanges and the solution of various important political issues which exist in the world today and which could be resolved through cooperation between the two nations.

Significantly, Kosygin's response was censored in TASS' 26 June version of the UN press conference which rendered his remarks on improving relations in a tougher, more

SECRET

SECRET

strident vein. TASS recorded Kosygin as stating that "it is impossible" to count on improved relations as long as the U.S. commits "aggression" against Vietnam. (A similar line was taken in an Izvestiya editorial on 30 June.) The TASS version altered Kosygin's remark on the possibility of mutual cooperation to read "cooperation between the two nations together with other nations."* And TASS deleted Kosygin's reassuring judgment, which followed his remarks on the possibility of Washington-Moscow cooperation, that "we are equally sure that the people of the United States [like the people of the Soviet Union] do not want war."**

Negotiations on Vietnam: The divergent conceptions held by Kosygin and Brezhnev on the nature of U.S.-USSR relations beyond Vietnam have recently been set against apparent differences on the possibility of East-West negotiations on the Vietnam war. Brezhnev has harshly debunked U.S. efforts to bring the issue to the table, while Kosygin has sought to use recent opportunities to try to commence discussions.

*On the subject of cooperation with capitalist states of Europe, Brezhnev and Podgorny in their 1967 election speeches stressed the line that the Soviet Union was acting jointly with other nations of the Warsaw Pact.

**Izvestiya on 26 June carried TASS' censored version of Kosygin's press conference and also quoted from President Johnson's 25 June remarks on the Glassboro talks, but Izvestiya did not cite the President's statements that his talks with Kosygin made the world a little less dangerous. Kosygin's judgment that Americans do not want war was not the conclusion drawn in a 19 August Pravda article by its correspondent Kurdyumov. Kurdyumov, who reported that he had sampled U.S. public opinion about the Vietnam war, concluded that the "majority is probably composed of those who have been deftly sold on the idea of imperialist superiority: America has never lost a war. How can it throw in the towel to the Viet Cong?"

SECRET

SECRET

The contrasts between the two leaders on this issue surfaced in the wake of Kosygin's February 1967 London discussions on the possibility of settling the Vietnam war. Brezhnev, in one particularly polemical passage in his March 1967 election speech, said that "now even the most naive people realize that U.S. ruling circles deceived the world and their own people when they stated that they were striving for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam issue." As if defending himself, Kosygin in his election speech explained that in early February 1967 "there appeared a real possibility of beginning talks on the Vietnam question...[and] only one thing was demanded of the leaders of the United States: that they...unconditionally halt their aggressive actions against the sovereign DRV. The American Government, however, did not make use of this opportunity."* Brezhnev, who did not discuss such a "real possibility" and unused "opportunity" to begin talks, concluded sharply that the alleged purposefully deceptive efforts of the U.S. leaders to try to "mislead naive people have crumbled." Kosygin plaintively concluded that the U.S. destroyed genuine "hopes" with what later proved to be "empty words calculated to deceive public opinion."**

On the general subject of the efficacy of negotiations, it is interesting to note that in his 19 June 1967 United Nations address Kosygin judged the peaceful resolution of "dangerous developments" in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, or any other place" as an imperative of state policy. He went on to tell the delegates that

*Pravda correspondent Yuri Zhukov stated in a late June 1967 conversation with U.S. Senator Hartke that the resumption of bombing the DRV was "costly" to Kosygin "who staked his personal prestige on the effort" to commence negotiations.

**Similarly, Khrushchev was subjected to indirect but unmistakable attack in the journal Oktyabr after the 1960 U-2 incident for having been hoodwinked into accepting President Eisenhower's "talk about peace."

SECRET

SECRET

No state or government, if it genuinely displays concern for peace and the prevention of a new war, can reason that if some event takes place far from its borders it can regard it with equanimity. Indeed, it cannot. A seemingly small event or so-called 'local wars' may grow into big military conflicts. This means that every state and government should not only refrain from bringing about new complications by its action, but it must undertake every effort to prevent any aggravation of the situation and moreover, the emergence of hotbeds of war, that should be quenched whenever they appear.

The Nature Of An East-West War: On the subject of a major military conflict, Kosygin in his U.N. speech introduced the first politburo-level discussion since the fall of Khrushchev on the mutually destructive nature of a future world war. Dwelling on the consequences of war --that is, that it would be inevitably fatal for many countries--has not been characteristic of post-Khrushchevian leadership pronouncements. And Kosygin's discussion of the nature of a worldwide conflict--and his assessment that it was essential to resolve the issues that might precipitate it--was broached in a distinctly argumentative passage which sought to deny the rationality of engaging in war under contemporary conditions. In his United Nations speech, he said:

No nation wants war. Nowadays nobody doubts that if a new world war starts, it would inevitably be a nuclear one. Its consequences would be fatal for many countries and peoples of the world. The more far-sighted statesmen from various countries, outstanding thinkers and scientists, warned of this from the very first day nuclear weapons came into existence. The nuclear age has created a new reality in questions of war and peace. It has vested in the states a far greater responsibility in all that pertains to these problems. This cannot be questioned by any politician, any military man unless he has lost the capacity for sensible thinking--all the more so since military men can imagine the aftermath of a nuclear war better than anyone else.

SECRET

SECRET

Kosygin then dramatically underscored the urgency of resolving conflicts by asserting that the Vietnam war "is fraught with a terrible danger of escalating into a major military clash between the powers."

His remarks on the nature of war revealed subtle and significant differences with Brezhnev's past references to the subject. The major implication of the differences concerns not only the relative emphasis on the importance of resolving limited conflict, but also the matter of Soviet defense allocations. For example, at Karlovy Vary, Brezhnev stated that "if a new war started in Europe it could become [mozhet stat'] thermonuclear and envelop the whole world," while at the United Nations Kosygin stated that "nobody doubts" that a new war "would inevitably [neizbezhno byla by] be a nuclear one." This argument, which Khrushchev developed in the early 1960s, has significant policy implications; the "inevitable" school has argued (1) that due to the mutually destructive effect of the use of nuclear weapons, all means must be taken to prevent the outbreak of the inevitable cataclysm that would result, and (2) that due to the fact that a major war would inevitably become a nuclear one, there is little need to maintain costly across-the-board preparations to fight a conventional conflict. The Brezhnev argument, elaborated upon by several Soviet military theorists in late 1965 and 1966,* asserts (1) that the possibility of a non-nuclear war should not be excluded under contemporary conditions for political and security reasons (such as the need for a credible rationale for the conventional role of the non-nuclear allies under the command of Moscow) and (2) that reliance on "massive nuclear retaliation" is not sufficient to prevent the outbreak of a war and that practical steps to deal with contingencies short of massive nuclear war should be taken. Accordingly, Brezhnev, more than any other politburo member, has stressed the need to improve the conventional

*See "Soviet Military Theorists Reappraise Nuclear War" (RRMM 66-6, September 1966).

SECRET

SECRET

forces. In his 3 July 1965 speech, for example, while speaking of Soviet ICBM and ABM* advances, he went on to emphasize the "great role belonging to conventional types of armament." He told his audience that the Soviet Army "is being constantly supplied with the most up-to-date tank, aviation, artillery and other equipment." Thereby he identified himself with the combined arms school of the late Defense Minister Malinovskiy, who one month earlier in the restricted military journal Military Thought argued, in the present tense, that "we consider it premature to 'bury' the infantry, as some people do."

Favoring the non-nuclear forces is also implicitly reflected in Brezhnev's rather conspicuous failure to spell out the mutually destructive "consequences" of a nuclear war. According to [redacted]

[redacted] Brezhnev said that as Chairman of the Defense Council he was "familiar with the consequences of modern war. Unfortunately there were certain people who did not understand this." (This particular remark was drawn in the context of an explicit attack on the Chinese Communist leadership.) To the same effect, Brezhnev said in his 5 July speech this year that the measures taken by the Soviet Union to "stay the [Israeli] aggressor's hand" prevented the three-day war from "reaching a size dangerous for all mankind." Thus he stopped short of employing the typically Kosygin-esque conclusion (which weakens the argument for across-the-board preparations to fight a conventional war) that the war would necessarily have ended in a nuclear, universal conflagration.

*While there have been indications of differences within the Soviet military over the ABM issue, politburo-level statements on strategic defense spending have not reflected differences. This is not to suggest that the politburo has decided to commit Soviet resources to an expanded deployment of the existing ABM system. In fact, the differing treatment given to key features of the sensitive ABM issue (such as the ABM's role in modern war, Soviet ABM capabilities, negotiations aimed at a U.S.-Soviet accord, etc.) by Soviet military leaders and commentators may reflect general indecision (or dissension) in the politburo on the matter of moving ahead with the expensive ABM program. At any rate, in the context of discussing Soviet ABM deployment, one Soviet official privately stated in early 1967 that Kosygin, "in particular," was "very desirous" of holding down arms expenditures in order to meet various economic needs.

SECRET

SECRET

Expansion of U.S.-Soviet Trade: The Vietnam "obstacle" hindered the development of Kosygin's proposals in late 1964 for greatly expanded U.S.-USSR trade. That Kosygin's plans were ambitious was suggested by the remarks of a group of visiting U.S. businessmen who reported that Kosygin in a 19 November 1964 closed session with the businessmen commented favorably on the possibility of settling Moscow's wartime lend-lease debts to the United States.* Kosygin's offer for a mutually agreeable compromise on the debt--the main political issue limiting U.S.-Soviet trade--was never made public in the Soviet Union, although Moscow propaganda pegged to the businessmen's visit with Kosygin displayed a strong interest in expanding East-West, and particularly U.S.-USSR trade. Kosygin also urged reduced armaments spending** and improved U.S.-Soviet economic relations in remarks to Western correspondents on 19 November 1964. He made a similar appeal in the context of his 9 December Supreme Soviet announcement that the USSR and the U.S. intended to spend less money on armaments. He said that the U.S. and the USSR "have every opportunity" to consolidate and continue joint efforts for better relations "by searching for and seeking solutions to controversial political questions and [questions] in the sphere of economic, cultural, and scientific ties." Later he called for a "truly extensive" expansion of trade with the West and stressed the possibility of "increasing considerably the capacity of the Soviet market."

While Brezhnev has not neglected the subject of external trade, his remarks have generally amounted to

*In the wake of the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Kosygin commented on a lend-lease settlement in his 6 November 1962 revolution anniversary speech.

**Reducing the Soviet armed forces to ten percent of its present size and eventually eliminating that force was regarded as a "happy prospect" by Kosygin in a conversation with the U.S. Ambassador on 7 November 1964.

SECRET

SECRET

little more than reiterations of earlier ambiguous formulas expressing a Soviet readiness to develop "foreign business relations." He has made no recent calls for expanded U.S.-Soviet trade. Kosygin, on the other hand, has continued to comment on the sensitive subject of trade with the U.S. During his 9 February 1967 BBC press conference, he repeatedly pointed out that the Soviet Union would like technical and trade cooperation with Western Europe "as well as the United States," but that "certain circumstances" precluded the possibility of active cooperation with the United States. He added, however, that "we would help and also certainly welcome the development of such cooperation with all nations, including the United States."

Western Europe: Toward A Meaningful Detente

Kosygin displayed his preference in pursuing Soviet national objectives through Soviet-West European cooperation on what he has called in numerous speeches this year a "pan-European basis."*

*The Gaullist-tinted vision of "pan-Europeanism" has been a favored and a frequent subject in Kosygin's speeches this year. On 8 February at the Guildhall in London for example, he painted the following utopian economic scenario:

The European states would receive great advantages from the expansion of their mutual economic, scientific, and technical ties. If, for example, we take the nations belonging to different social systems under conditions of an international detente and a safeguarded security, they could boldly go forward toward a more profound international division of labor in Europe and thereby more effectively use the opportunities of each state to the advantage not only of its own self, but to the advantage of all the participants in international economic exchanges. And it may be said with confidence that with a reasonable utilization of all the available natural wealth in Europe, including the resources of the Soviet Union, and the reasonable use of the industrial potential, the accumulated skills,

(footnote continued on page 50)

SECRET

SECRET

Kosygin's theme that political and military security and economic progress can be achieved through European cooperation is devoid of Brezhnev's three prerequisites --maintain the status quo, isolate the West Germans, strengthen frontiers of the socialist camp--which amount to restraints on the development of meaningful intra-European cooperation. In his election speech his year, Kosygin pointedly argued that "it would be naive to expect [European cooperation] to occur automatically without any application of effort, without struggle." In short, he seemed to be denying Brezhnev's proposition that the attainment of the earlier-discussed three objectives would, ipso facto, create the possibilities for fruitful, Soviet-West European cooperation. Kosygin went on to emphasize favorable developments (instead of dwelling on future possibilities) involving current cooperation with specific

(footnote continued from page 49)

experience, and the knowledge of the toiling people, Europe is capable of forging ahead in the vanguard of the world's economic, scientific, and technical progress.

Political and military security were the chief themes of his pan-European remarks in his 6 March Moscow election speech:

In this region [Europe], burned in the conflagrations of two world wars, new tendencies are clearly displayed. These tendencies consist of the fact that in many West European states the insolvency of a political course connected with the activities of the NATO military bloc is being recognized. The idea is penetrating deeper and deeper into the awareness of the broadest strata of the population that security in Europe and the solution of its problems could be best insured by strengthening relations between West and East--the developments of cooperation on a pan-European basis.

And tariff reforms were added to the above political and military security pitches in his 21 March references to European cooperation

SECRET

SECRET

West European countries. Brezhnev in his election speech briefly acknowledged that the USSR "is working tirelessly" to develop mutually advantageous contacts and to strengthen cooperation with "those countries seeking such cooperation" (presumably France in particular). Yet unlike Kosygin, he placed the realization of cooperation in Europe as a whole in the indefinite future by asserting that Soviet contacts with West European governments are "preparing good ground for wider and more fruitful cooperation between the states of Europe."

Relations with Bonn: West Germany was not one of the "cooperating" nations singled out by Kosygin, though in the past two-and-one-half years he has voiced a relatively temperate position on dealing with West Germany. (Brezhnev, meanwhile, has concentrated solely on the prerequisites to FRG-USSR cooperation, such as a renunciation of "revanchist claims" and so forth.) For example, in his 1 March 1965 Leipzig speech, after having expressed interest in expanding Soviet-West German cooperation in the chemical fertilizer industry, Kosygin said that "the Soviet Government by no means intends to consider West Germany as an outcast where everything is bad and nothing is good." In his 7 May 1966 East Berlin VE Day speech he said that

the Soviet Union by no means holds that all West Germans are imbued with the ideas of revanchism... It is being said that the new generation of Germans who have grown up in the Federal Republic since the war cannot be held responsible for the crimes committed by nazism. It would indeed be unjust to saddle today's West German youth with this grave responsibility.

And, finally, in his 9 February 1967 BBC interview he said that the Soviet Union shall always entertain respect for the German people, but "what we do hate is any new display of fascism."

Brezhnev's recent comments on "good Germans" have been directed solely toward the working class which, he said in his Karlovy Vary speech, "have shown in the class

SECRET

SECRET

clashes that a movement against militarism and fascism is growing in West Germany itself." In his 18 April 1967 East Berlin speech Brezhnev indicated that the "eternal mark of Cain" might be erased once West Germany reversed its principal domestic and foreign policies, after having twice asserted that one must regard Communists as "very naive people" to hope that they would not see the supposedly insidious motives behind Bonn's East European recognition campaign. Kosygin balanced repeated appeals for cooperation and a readiness to develop Soviet-West European cooperation with attacks against West German "imperialists" in Paris in December 1966, London in February 1967 and Moscow in March. But he cast no aspersions on the FRG's recognition campaign and made no indictment of the SPD for its failure to legalize the KPD.* Kosygin in the past has not infrequently referred to the "party of the German working class" (in his view, the KPD), but, as in the typical case of his 9 February BBC press conference, he did not go on to criticize the West German social democrats and, in fact, exonerated the German people from past crimes against the working class.

*A seeming aberration in Kosygin's comparatively moderate statements on Germany appeared in his election speech this year. He voiced the particularly malicious distortion that "quite recently Chancellor Kiesinger made a statement which made it clear that he did not exclude the possibility of setting up a coalition government of the Federal Republic with the participation of the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party. Who can guarantee that the ruling circles of Bonn will not later on call for the establishment of a purely fascist government." No "recent" statement made by Kiesinger even remotely "makes it clear" that the NDP would be welcomed in a coalition government. On the contrary, Kiesinger has repeatedly and explicitly excluded the NDP from the current coalition government. For example, in his 3 March Neue Revue interview (the one in which he discussed the possibilities of legalizing the KPD), Chancellor Kiesinger referred to the NDP as a "radical group" and stated that the most effective means of "fighting" radical groups is an efficient policy.

SECRET

SECRET

B. Balancing The Domestic Economy

Generally consistent with his assertions since Khrushchev's ouster, Kosygin's recent speeches have continued to place consumer welfare before defense in listing the domestic tasks of the party.

Kosygin's position on this sensitive matter of allocations was first suggested in remarks given within hours of Brezhnev's first speech as party leader. Like Brezhnev, Kosygin bowed to the military in his 19 October 1964 reception remarks in mentioning the supposed necessity to strengthen defenses, but he took a different tack than Brezhnev in placing no prerequisites before what he (Kosygin) called the most "lofty and vital tasks...of insuring a steady growth of the living standards and welfare of the Soviet people."* That Kosygin's support was strong for the consumer sector was further suggested by the fact that his remark on "steady growth" followed the sober reminder to the costly defense and space industry that "while storming the skies we do not want to forget about the earth, about our great earthly affairs." A similar tone was struck in his public remarks on 19 November 1964; according to Western press sources, Kosygin lamented the U.S. and Soviet consumers' sacrifice to the high cost of defense and stated that "the whole of mankind eagerly awaits the day when we [the United States and the Soviet Union] both spend less money on armaments and more on meeting the needs of the individual."

*Kosygin's appeal for a "steady growth" of consumer goods may well have reflected his principal argument with Khrushchev, who in September 1964 had advocated a dramatic redistribution of the economy in the direction of the consumer. While Kosygin's remark suggested that he did not favor a drastic sudden change in favor of the consumer sector, his statements also suggested that he did not favor the policy of continuing to give the massive proportion to the heavy industry sector.

SECRET

SECRET

The initial differences on this economic issue later developed into a pattern in the first half of 1965, with Kosygin generally placing consumer interests in front of heavy industry in his public remarks. Brezhnev, as mentioned earlier, reversed the order.

Kosygin's identification with consumer interests was reinforced by his public and private support for a proposal to cut the Soviet military's share of the 1965 budget by 500 million rubles. Brezhnev did not take a public position on the military budget cut. Thus, he joined the leading marshals, with whom he had closely associated himself,* in their "conspiracy of silence" on the planned defense cut.

Brezhnev's silence on Kosygin's plan was particularly conspicuous in light of his (Brezhnev's) practice under Khrushchev of promptly reacting to proposals to reduce the military budget. He was among the first to endorse the Khrushchev-sponsored defense economy measures of January 1960, December 1963 and February 1964 --though not Khrushchev's eleventh-hour proposal in September 1964. In October 1964 both Brezhnev and Kosygin had given generally similar pledges to strengthen the might of the Soviet Union in their early post-coup speeches, but in November 1964 Brezhnev made a stronger appeal for "the highest possible level" for Soviet defenses. In 1965 Brezhnev took the lead in promoting a program of stepped up military spending. Kosygin only belatedly

*The U.S. embassy in Moscow reported that at the 7 November 1964 Kremlin reception Brezhnev toasted the armed forces (and Malinovsky by name) and later called upon Malinovskiy, who delivered an attack on U.S. policy. Malinovsky went on to claim that the USSR could crush the U.S. The embassy reported that Kosygin then tried to smooth things over with the U.S. Ambassador after Malinovsky's diatribe, with statements to the effect that the "main preoccupation" of the new Soviet leadership would be to overcome various shortcomings in the USSR.

SECRET

SECRET

gave his support to the reversal of his position. At the time, he accused the U.S. policy-makers of perfidy in increasing the Pentagon's budget and thus undermining his position on the Soviet military cut.

Though he lost ground in 1965 to those pressing for increased spending in the heavy-defense industry sector, his early call for a "steady growth" of the proportion of the Soviet budget devoted to consumer production nonetheless was incorporated into the 23rd CPSU Congress resolutions. And unlike Brezhnev, Kosygin in his 1967 election speech commented upon the proportional development theme endorsed by the Congress. He said:

The bringing together of the rate of growth of agricultural production and the rate of growth of industry, and of the rate of growth of production of consumer goods and the rate of growth of production of the means of production, has started. All this is needed in order to raise the well-being of the Soviet people more rapidly.

Two years earlier he had asked for a readjustment in economic proportions in order to "improve the living standards of the people more rapidly." He combined his request with criticism of "some leaders [who] may have doubts or even raise objections when discussing the question of proportions." (9 March 1965 speech to the officials of Gosplan USSR). "Some of these people cannot but be influenced by the departmental approach, which runs counter to the national interests," he charged. Reporting to his 1967 electors "with satisfaction" the tidings that the "first important steps" had been taken in the direction of the improvement of the main ratios in the proportional development of the national economy, Kosygin continued to complain that the demand for clothing, footwear, refrigerators, furniture and television sets "is far from being met fully today." And he warily concluded that the "major measures" being taken "should" lead to an increase in such consumer goods. Brezhnev acknowledged that the production of such goods is insufficient, but he confidently assured his electors on 10 April 1967 that "we are reacting to these difficulties."

SECRET

SECRET

The "Productive" Role of the Ministries: Predictably, Kosygin has promoted the prerogatives of his ministerial empire. In his recent remarks, he has welcomed a recent party-state decision which expands the rights of ministers in the sphere of capital construction. Kosygin explained that union republican building ministries have been formed which would carry out "both industrial and housing, civil communal construction"--in other words a clear mandate to perform tasks that had been, at least in part, the concern shared by certain city soviets.

And in the context of discussing the expansion of ministerial powers, Kosygin--who had paid deference to the party throughout most of his speech--placed his ministerial apparatus before the party in discussing the execution of one important sphere of policy. Here he revived a highly sensitive point last employed by one of his predecessors, Malenkov. Kosygin said:

A radical improvement of capital construction is now a task of cardinal national economic importance. On its solution should be concentrated the attention and forces of [note the order] ministries and departments, party organizations, soviets of workers deputies, and our entire public.*

Conspicuously, Pravda's 7 March account of Kosygin's speech (which was broadcast live) deleted the above remark, though Pravda printed Kosygin's next comment which was that the "party and the government" unswervingly pursue the line of raising the level of the life of Soviet people.

Concurrently, with regard to the subject of party leadership, Kosygin has frequently invoked the self-

*Malenkov in his 8 August 1953 Supreme Soviet speech stated that "the government and the Central Committee" had decided to make certain changes dealing with the personal income of collective farmers. After his fall Malenkov was accused of placing the state over the party.

SECRET

SECRET

protective "collective leadership" and associated themes. In both his 1966 and 1967 election speeches Kosygin referred to collectivity--a subject about which Brezhnev in both his last two campaign speeches was notably silent.*

PODGORNY: FIRMNESS ABROAD, WELL BEING AT HOME

Since December 1965--when Podgornyy was kicked upstairs to the largely honorific Supreme Soviet chairmanship (replacing Mikoyan) and removed from the secretariat--he has had to operate from a relatively weak organizational position. Following the assumption of his Supreme Soviet job, Podgornyy has shifted his domestic views from an outright supporter of pro-consumer interests to a more conservative line, though he has not fully endorsed all of Brezhnev's economic formulations. The switch from his earlier policy position displays the characteristics of a politburo apparachik opportunistically maneuvering to improve his relative power position (in this case, by joining the Brezhnev "bandwagon").

While subtle differences with Brezhnev may be found in certain foreign policy statements recently made by Podgornyy, his comments have reiterated his earlier harsh line, particularly on Soviet policy toward the United States, and, on balance, his foreign policy statements have generally been a reflection of those of the general secretary.

*Brezhnev's last reference to the modes of leadership was reminiscent of Khrushchev's remarks on his 70th birthday on 17 April 1964 ("not everything depends on me; I work in a collective"). Accepting the Hero of the Soviet Union award (19 December 1966) Brezhnev said: "In face of the great and intricate tasks which have to be accomplished, I am encouraged by the awareness of the fact that in the politburo, in the secretariat, in the entire central committee, and in the government we are working as a smooth, harmonious collective, relying on each other's assistance."

SECRET

SECRET



Podgornyy

A. Hostility Toward America, Cooperation With Europe

Support for Brezhnev's foreign views was clearly displayed in Podgornyy's 9 March 1967 election speech in which he went so far as to revive the Stalin-Zhdanov post-war thesis that the world was divided into "camps of war and peace." In this vein, he claimed that the "wild men" in the "war" camp "are ready to go as far as to unleash a new world war,"* and, consistent with his recent statements,

*Podgornyy hastened to add that such "wild men" are "in fact being helped by those in China who today call themselves the utmost revolutionary leftwingers; that is those who do not exclude a world military conflict from the possible means of attaining their adventurist aims."

SECRET

SECRET

asserted that the strength of the socialist bloc "is the main bulwark in the struggle for peace and against the aggressive aspirations of imperialism." Accordingly, Podgornyy has been careful not to stray from the emphasis given by Brezhnev on joint bloc action with regard to the Soviet Union's policies toward West Europe.

Somewhat inconsistent with his harsh rhetoric and not unlike Kosygin, Podgornyy gave high priority in his 1967 election speech to furthering cooperation with the governments of Western Europe. And while reflecting Brezhnev's lowered emphasis on peaceful coexistence, Podgornyy did not limit the pursuit of peaceful coexistence to the capitalist countries of Europe:

While conducting a resolute and strenuous struggle against the aggressive policy of imperialism, our country is at the same time consistently pursuing the Leninist course of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. We favor normal relations with the capitalist countries and are developing economic, trade, cultural, and other relations with them.

He did not, however, go on to make an explicit call for better U.S.-Soviet relations, a subject upon which he (like Brezhnev) has been notably reticent in public.

Within three weeks of Khrushchev's political demise, Podgornyy joined the Brezhnev-sponsored move in the leadership to upgrade the national liberation and anti-imperialist themes. He stressed the need to oppose the "export of counterrevolution," and like Brezhnev at that time, he did not mention its Khrushchevian corollary, the inadmissibility of Communists "exporting revolution":

The Soviet people actively support the national liberation movement, the struggle of the once oppressed and dependent countries for their complete political and economic emancipation. It firmly and consistently rejects any imperialist exportation of counterrevolution; it supports the people's sacred right to fight for their liberation,

SECRET

SECRET

including just wars against subjugators. (5 November 1964, Cuba Socialista article by Podgornyy)

Brezhnev's line giving increased priority to supporting national liberation movements and sacrificing improved relations with the United States continued to be voiced by Podgornyy through 1965. In one case, in his 24 July 1965 Sevastopol speech, Podgornyy used a particularly sharp illustration to show the "principles of proletarian internationalism." He boasted that Soviet material support (i.e., surface-to-air missiles) to the DRV had turned U.S. airplanes "into piles of metal scattered in the Vietnamese jungles." U.S. activity in Panama, the Congo, the Dominican Republic and West Germany were also attacked by Podgornyy in 1965 and 1966. He laced his attacks on the "worldwide" scope of U.S. ambitions with repeated references to the dominance of the "hawks" in American foreign policy-making. Unlike Kosygin, he has not pointed to the existence of "sounder tendencies" in Washington policy-making circles. Characteristically, in his 1967 election speech Podgornyy spoke only of the "hawks" on the Vietnam issue in American politics. Thus he stressed that "quite a few U.S. political figures" wanted to end the Vietnamese war by a "radical intensification" of U.S. military action in order to "speed the collapse of the [Vietnamese peoples] resistance and force them to their knees."

In [] conversations with U.S. officials, however, Podgornyy, for reasons (apparently) of diplomacy, has talked a milder line. Thus in his 11 November 1966 conversation with departing U.S. Ambassador Kohler, Podgornyy mentioned only the Vietnam problem as an impediment to major U.S.-USSR cooperation. With regard to cooperation, he expressed his pleasure in the fact that in spite of Vietnam limited agreements could be reached. (He cited the U.S.-Soviet air agreement, the negotiations on the now completed outer space agreement, and the possibility of an extension of desalinization agreements.)

SECRET

SECRET

B. Personal Prosperity and Production

While Podgornyy's dual emphasis in the past on foreign danger and domestic well-being appeared to be inconsistent, it is noteworthy that his recent remarks on internal affairs suggest a marked shift toward more conservative views. Podgornyy's recent formulations, nevertheless, contain significant aspects of Kosygin's domestic preferences--such as an emphasis on the proportional development thesis and on the need for greater efforts to improve the standard of living. But, like Brezhnev, Podgornyy has recently placed special emphasis on successes in agriculture and industry as a prerequisite for meeting consumer demands:

The indisputable successes have been achieved in agriculture...and [in] the insuring of raw materials for industry. This is one of the most important conditions of the implementation by the party in the last few years of the course of bringing the pace of growth of heavy industry closer to the pace of growth of the light and foodstuffs industry. At present one can already see the results. Yet, it is still insufficient. The demand of the population is not met completely.

A mixture of both Brezhnev's and Kosygin's formulations was presented in other remarks on internal policy by Podgornyy in his 9 March election speech this year. Podgornyy stated that "in the future we shall...have to expand heavy industry at a high rate," and "continue to take all measures to constantly maintain the military might of the Soviet state at the level necessary to crush any aggressor." Yet, like Kosygin, Podgornyy stressed consumer needs and placed welfare before defense in his discussion of party tasks as he had done in his election speech last year: "The further development of the economy will allow us to meet the people's requirements increasingly better and [secondly] constantly strengthen the might of the Soviet state."

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

The salient feature, as mentioned earlier, is that Podgornyy's March 1967 formulas mark another step in the evolution of his extreme consumer-oriented policy views. His most extreme views were presented in his 1965 speeches which provided support for the 1963-1964 "butter-over-guns" policy proposals of Kosygin's predecessor.* With regard to "guns," Podgornyy was the only presidium member to publicly praise the military budget cut plan (5 January 1965 speech in Turkey) announced by Premier Kosygin. With regard to "butter," Podgornyy in his 21 May 1965 Baku speech went so far as to employ one of the key arguments used in support of proposals for a fundamental shift in the Soviet economy in favor of the consumer sector voiced by Khrushchev shortly before his fall. In Baku Podgornyy said:

There was a time when the Soviet people deliberately accepted certain material restrictions in the interests of the priority development of heavy industry and the strengthening of our defense capacity. This was fully justified, because it is precisely production which is the material basis for the growth of culture and of the welfare of our people, and a defenseless socialist state would have been inevitably crushed by imperialism.

Now with each passing year our social wealth is multiplying and the necessary conditions are being created better to satisfy the ever-growing cultural and domestic ambitions of the working people.

Podgornyy did not repeat such explicit pro-consumer views after his December 1965 "honorable demotion" to the Supreme Soviet chairmanship. In fact, he noted in his 9 June 1966 election speech that the Soviet Union maintains the "high rates of development of heavy industry and we are

*Favored development of light and consumer industries was an implicit part of Khrushchev's December 1963 and February 1964 renewed appeals for a Soviet troop and military budget cut.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

steadily concerned with strengthening the defense capability of the country." He went on, however, to stress that "at the same time" the party's task "is to secure a higher rate of growth of the national income, particularly in the sector spent on consumption."

Finally, Podgornyy's formula presented in his recent election speech (cited earlier) moved even closer to the economic views of Brezhnev. And in what seemed to be a dual effort to further the "cult of Brezhnev" and to represent Brezhnev's views as similar to his, Podgornyy added to the reasons that had been given in the official message on the occasion of the award of the Order of Lenin to Brezhnev. Where the official message stressed Brezhnev's military contributions, Podgornyy's remarks highlighted Brezhnev's supposed contributions in economic, social, and political fields as well as in the military.*

Expanding the Role of the Supreme Soviet: Renewing the line emphasized in his June 1966 election speech and August 1966 Supreme Soviet speech, Podgornyy stressed the allegedly more active role of his Supreme Soviet, implicitly

*18 December 1966 Party-Government message to Brezhnev: "...for outstanding services to the Communist Party and the Soviet state in the building of Communism, the strengthening of the country's defense potential, for great services in the struggle against the German fascist invaders on the fronts of the Patriotic War, and on the occasion of his 60th birthday."

19 December 1966 Podgornyy presentation remarks: "...for an exceptionally great contribution to the activity of the party and state in the restoration of Leninist principles and standards, in switching the economy to scientifically motivated development, in strengthening the defense potential of the country, and in implementing major social developments for the good of the people."

SECRET

SECRET

argued that it was not a "rubber stamp" parliament, stated that the soviets control and check "all the state organs" (Kosygin's domain), and praised the expanded activity of the permanent commissions of the supreme and republic level soviets.* Podgornyy in his 2 August 1966 speech had gratefully acknowledged that Brezhnev at the 23rd CPSU Congress had raised the issue of creating new Supreme Soviet permanent commissions. The new commissions, which were set up in August 1966 and staffed with party apparachiks, were apparently designed to strengthen the Supreme Soviet in its dealings with Kosygin's Council of Ministers. In short, it appears that Brezhnev--who in December 1966 became a member of Podgornyy's Supreme Soviet presidium--concluded that greater party control was needed over the formulation and execution of state legislation. And by instilling some life into the comparatively weak organization headed by Podgornyy, Brezhnev could check Kosygin's power without giving Podgornyy enough organizational authority to eventually rival his (Brezhnev's) position.

Brezhnev has continued his apparent effort to play off Podgornyy against Kosygin. In his 10 March 1967 speech, Brezhnev revealed that the central committee "a few days ago" had adopted a resolution which, in effect, backed up Podgornyy's 9 March 1967 appeal for enhanced authority of the local soviets in their dealings with Kosygin's all-union ministries. Podgornyy had stressed that every local soviet "should make fuller use of its rights and obligations" in the fields of economic, cultural and "all matters of local significance."

Interestingly, the apparent squeeze play against Kosygin has not been going smoothly. For example, divergent

*Permanent commissions are bodies which continue to work between the biannual Supreme Soviet sessions. While the commissions are nominally empowered to check on ministerial activity and to implement resolutions passed by the Supreme Soviet, the commissions in the past have been effectively bypassed by the Council of Ministers. Ministerial bodies, acting on the approval of the central committee, have implemented the vast majority of state legislation.

SECRET

SECRET

handling by the party's and the government's newspapers of the substance of the Brezhnev-introduced party resolution on the local soviets (discussed above) suggests that that particular issue was not settled by the resolution. (This surmise is strengthened by the fact that the text of the resolution was not printed; it was only reported upon.) A Pravda report (11 March) on the Brezhnev-introduced party resolution suggested that the recommendations of the local soviets are henceforth to carry greater weight and that Kosygin's local "organizations and institutions" are now obliged to carry out the recommendations of the local soviets:*

The CPSU Central Committee emphasized that the rural and settlement soviets of workers' deputies are the highest organs of state power on their territory that decisions and instructions of the rural and settlement soviets taken by them within the sphere of their competence must be carried out by all authorities as well as by all enterprises, organizations and institutions located on the territory of the soviet.

Reflecting Kosygin's preference, Izvestiya's belated editorial comment (25 March) on the party resolution deleted the passage underlined above, but included a subsequent passage which stated that the local soviets "must coordinate" their recommendations with the "enterprises, organizations and institutions" on each particular soviet territory.

*In 1966, some republic Supreme Soviet leaders, such as Arutyunyan (an Armenian Supreme Soviet official) had complained that the all-union ministries had been ignoring the recommendations and orders of the local soviets.

For an examination of the development of the ministry-parliament issue in 1965 and 1966 see "The New Soviet Constitution And The Party-State Issue In CPSU Politics, 1956-1966" (CAESAR XXVII, 21 July 1966) pp. 83-88.

SECRET

SECRET

And on the larger issue of the powers of the Supreme Soviet permanent commissions vis-a-vis the powers of Kosygin's Council of Ministers, controversy may be reflected in the delay in the adoption of new statutes for the permanent commissions--a statute which had been called for in "the near future" by Podgornyy in August 1966. In the meantime, the government press continues to spotlight the active role of the permanent commissions of the presidium of the Council of Ministers.*

Plenum Preferences: The Brezhnev-Podgornyy "alliance" is also reflected in the emphasis the two give to the March 1965 CPSU plenum--at which Brezhnev presented his agricultural proposals--and the corresponding de-emphasis given to the September 1965 CPSU plenum--at which Kosygin presented his industrial reform plan. In his election speech, Podgornyy concentrated solely on the salutary effects of the March agricultural plenum. Like Brezhnev, Podgornyy made no specific reference to Kosygin's September industrial reform plenum though he combined, and warmly praised, recent industrial reorganization and agricultural measures.

Kosygin, for his part, praised the decisions of the plenum associated with Brezhnev, but he made it clear that the March 1965 decisions were not the sole reason for the increase in agricultural gross production in 1966:

*Thus prior to the decision regarding capital construction that Kosygin introduced in his election speech, Izvestiya reported on 26 February that "a few days ago a conference, held at the Council of Ministers USSR, discussed a draft, worked out by the commissions of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers USSR, of a general statute on the USSR ministries. It also discussed drafts of decisions to further expand the rights of the USSR ministers and to refer questions of economic and capital construction to council of ministers of union republics for further determination."

SECRET

SECRET

The economic measures worked out by the March plenum of the central committee and the labor upsurge of the workers, collective farm workers and specialists were the decisive condition for speeding up the development of agriculture.

And, unlike both Podgornyy and Brezhnev, Kosygin specifically praised the decisions of his September 1965 industrial plenum in a passage (in his 1967 election speech) that did not combine industry with agricultural production.

SUSLOV: U.S. MAIN FOREIGN DANGER: PARTY "IMPURITY" MAIN DOMESTIC DANGER.

Foreign Views: Suslov's positions parallel Brezhnev's on matters of Soviet foreign policy. In his capacity as



Suslov

SECRET

SECRET

the party's chief ideological guardian, Suslov has given particular attention to the formation of an "anti-U.S. imperialist front" to meet what he consistently portrays as a worldwide threat from U.S. imperialism. U. S. support and encouragement for "West German militarism" has also been a frequent theme in Suslov's assessments. But his general theme as it was expressed in his 27 January 1966 speech at the Italian Communist party congress, has been that the U.S. is purposefully and persistently undermining the policy of peaceful coexistence by increasing international tension.

To remedy this supposedly formidable threat, Suslov has insistently called for Communist unity under the CPSU aegis. While Suslov has attacked the Chinese in private discussions with Communist party members, he, unlike other Soviet leaders (with the exception of Shelepin) has exercised conspicuous restraint on the Chinese issue in his public statements. Since Khrushchev's fall he has avoided attacking the Chinese by name. Even his indirect public attacks have been mild. At a time when other leaders were openly castigating the Chinese, he only alluded obliquely to Chinese obstreperousness. For example, in his 2 November 1966 Helsinki speech, instead of attacking Chinese "splitting" activities, he merely indicated their refusal to join in unity efforts by saying that "the great majority of the sister parties" are trying to strengthen the world Communist movement. Thus it was left to the listener to recall that the Chinese were not part of that majority. Suslov was an early promoter of the early post-Khrushchev policy of not engaging in polemics with the Chinese. Other sources have reported that Suslov has been optimistic about the possibility of an accommodation with the Chinese after Mao.

Suslov has even argued for a modified version of the old Comintern line of thirty years ago, in the context of calling for a united front of "all democratic, anti-imperialist forces." In this connection, in his 4 October 1965 speech Suslov equated the policy of the present U.S. administration with pre-war fascism. But at the same time,

SECRET

Suslov betrayed reluctance about cooperation with West European social democratic leaders. He reasserted Stalin's spurious judgment that the right-wing social democrat leaders were responsible for the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II as a result of splitting the European workers' movement in the 30's.

Domestic Views: The conservatism of Suslov's foreign policy pronouncements complements his rigid, doctrinaire domestic pronouncements, particularly those on the role of the CPSU, on the priority development of the heavy industry sector, and on the need to instill discipline and vigilance in the populus.

Suslov in his 1966 election speech set the stage for his comments on the CPSU's internal disciplinary tasks by first unearthing the early postwar Soviet dichotomic world view. "We cannot forget for a single moment," Suslov argued, "the fact that a bitter class struggle between the two systems, socialism and capitalism, is taking place in the international arena." And on the basis of capitalism's "psychological war" aimed at subverting socialism, Suslov appealed for a return to Zhdanovism in Soviet cultural affairs:

It goes without saying that the enemies of socialism cannot stop the progress of the Soviet society to Communism, but should we be complacent, they can create difficulties and obstacles in this path. And that is why, in relation to this, it is necessary to maintain vigilance, and our ideological work must be of a militant nature in exposing in its true light the bourgeois ideology and the liberal attitude toward it. The Communist Party sees as its main task the preservation of purity and generally multiplying the glorious fighting traditions of the party and the working class and in mobilizing all the efforts and energy of the Soviet people toward the achievements of big new triumphs in the building of Communism.

Preserving the party's traditional role in the nation's economic affairs was emphasized in Suslov's 2 June 1965 speech in Sofia. He attacked the Khrushchevian

SECRET

concept of the economic-oriented party (the 1962 "party production principle"). He emphasized (as he had done under Khrushchev) the primacy of the party's political-ideological role. In this connection, Suslov's views of the correct role for the party and for the state (though differently motivated) resemble Kosygin's. That is, that the state is to be concerned with the day-to-day operation of the nation's economic life, while the party is to be the guardian of the Marxist-Leninist ideological teachings and the director (but not the operator) of the state. This division of responsibilities was set forth in the 1961 Party Program--a document recently ignored by Brezhnev, but favorably mentioned by Suslov in his 2 November 1966 Helsinki address and in his 4 March 1967 campaign speech.

But on the issue of economic priorities, Suslov (like Brezhnev) has listed the heavy and defense industry before light industry. In the available versions of his 1967 election speech he dwelt only on achievements in the heavy industry sphere (power generation, machine building, chemical and oil refining industry). With regard to the light industry-consumer sector, Suslov appeared to rest content that the problems were being adequately met. This complacent tone was reflected in his Helsinki remarks in 1966 in which he emphasized Soviet industrial developments and then briefly claimed that "light industry and food production are developing today at a greater speed than heretofore." In his 1966 election speech he stated that in spite of the "aggravation of the international situation" and the underfulfillment of certain parts of the seven-year plan (he mentioned agriculture in particular) the Soviet Union, nonetheless, "had done a lot in the struggle to raise material well-being."

Material compensations to induce workers to step up production have not been completely ignored by Suslov, though he has put his usual emphasis on moral incentives. For instance, in his 2 November 1966 Helsinki speech, Suslov singled out material compensations for farm workers as only one of many party-approved factors that spurred agricultural production.

SECRET

SECRET

SHELEPIN: MILITANCY ABROAD, THE HARD LINE AT HOME

Foreign Views: Of all the politburo members Shelepin has drawn the most consistently harsh and ominous picture of the world situation, and has promptly endorsed and even sharpened themes introduced by Brezhnev. Shelepin was the first politburo (then presidium) member to endorse Brezhnev's 3 December 1964 threat to aid North Vietnam (27 December 1964 Cairo speech). Shelepin was the first to expand upon Brezhnev's altered definition of peaceful coexistence. In response to a question asked at his 28 December 1964 Cairo press conference Shelepin reportedly replied that "there were many obstacles in the way of peaceful coexistence [with the U.S.], but the most significant one is U.S. imperialism's interference in the affairs...of the peoples of Vietnam, Cuba, and the Congo." Shelepin then went on to judge as false what he called the U.S. view that the USSR is afraid of war: "All peoples realize that we do not fear war, and this is what the United States should understand also." (Reflecting sensitivity on the policy implications of that reported boast, Soviet accounts of the press conference deleted Shelepin's remark.) In his 1965 visits to North Korea and North Vietnam he tailored his remarks for his audiences by avoiding any mention of peaceful coexistence as an element of Soviet foreign policy.* In his most

*In his visit to North Vietnam in February 1965, Kosygin not only referred to "peaceful coexistence," but he defined it in terms used by Khrushchev. In his 7 February speech in Hanoi, TASS reported that Kosygin declared: "Invariably following the Leninist policy of peace and peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, the Soviet Union threatens no country. The Soviet people regard the peoples' struggle for peace as a struggle for creating the most favorable conditions for the consolidation and development of the socialist community, for promoting the revolutionary workers and national liberation movements." And in the wake of the U.S. Air Force bombing of the Dong Hoi and Vinh Linh areas on 7 and 8 February, the text of the 11 February USSR-DRV joint (footnote continued on page 72)

SECRET

SECRET

recent remarks on that subject (9 December 1966 Kalinin speech) Shelepin virtually buried coexistence in an appeal for greater vigilance and military strength in order to render a "shattering rebuff to any imperialist aggressor."

Shelepin was the first political spokesman following Kosygin's December 1964 proposal for a military budget cut to mention the necessity of "strengthening the defense might of our country" (25 February 1965 war veterans conference in Moscow). He was the first to explicitly forecast that the new five-year plan would concentrate attention on the "further strengthening" of the Soviet military (24 June 1965 Severomorsk speech) due to what he portrayed as the worldwide aggressive ambitions of the United States. In his July 1965 speech he not only echoed Brezhnev's line that the world was living through a period of unrelieved international tension, but Shelepin went out of his way to raise the alarm of supposed American military actions directed against the Soviet Union. Cast in the first person singular, his object lesson for vigilance in July 1965 was presented dramatically:

British and American submarines appeared recently near our northern shores. I believe that it is probably not out of love for the beauty of the Far North that in these days the American icebreaker Northwind is plowing its severe waters.

(footnote continued from page 71)

statement on the visit included a Kosygin-like reference to the effect that defending peace means (among other things) struggling "for the implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence between countries having different political and social systems, and for the settlement of international disputes through negotiations." Interestingly, the above reference was not prefaced by a phrase indicating joint agreement, as in the case of other sections in the joint statement. In brief, it appears that Kosygin was not willing to delete peaceful coexistence from the elements of Soviet foreign policy in order to please his audience.

SECRET

SECRET

The speed with which a war can come to Soviet shores was highlighted in a remark in Shelepin's 2 June 1966 Leningrad election speech which came close to refuting the Khrushchevian emphasis, dating back to the 1956 CPSU Congress, on the non-inevitability of war. Shelepin stated that the party and the state must "explain tirelessly to the masses the real position of how mysteriously war is born, how it can descend on us at the most unexpected moment." Comments from other politburo leaders shortly thereafter suggest that they thought Shelepin had gone too far, and they offered counter-balancing arguments. Thus five days later, Suslov in his Leningrad election speech countered with the 1956 party-approved position that while the threat of a new war does exist, "it does not mean that it will be inevitable" due to the "real forces" in the world which were capable of thwarting the "imperialist's" intentions. In Karlovy Vary in 1967 (with Shelepin as the number-two man in the Soviet delegation) Brezhnev took a somewhat intermediate position by telling the delegates that "we do not want to exaggerate the danger of war, but neither do we wish to underestimate it." The central committee's Theses on the 50th anniversary do not address the issue of the non-inevitability of war, and the Theses turn around the Khrushchevian emphasis of the 1960 CPSU Congress' line on the possibility of preventing war. The 1967 document states that "the peoples now have sufficient might to avert the outbreak of a new world war by active and coordinated actions. However, as long as imperialism exists the threat of aggressive wars remains."

With regard to his emphasis on the continued possibility of war, Shelepin's comments on the desirability of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement were particularly revealing: in Cairo on 28 December 1964 he reportedly forecast that the dispute will "inevitably disappear," that Moscow's and Peking's "ultimate aims are one and the same," and that "like them, we adopt a staunch attitude against imperialism." And his provocative attitude toward the U.S. rescue effort in the Congo was displayed in his comment [redacted] that the [redacted] that the [redacted] decided to aid the Congo rebels rather than rely on "weak and ineffective protests."

SECRET

SECRET

Shelepin's more recent remarks on foreign matters sustain his earlier expressed bias in favor of an aggressive foreign line. In his last recorded speech in which he commented on the international situation (Kalinin, 9 December 1966)*, he held on to the precept that "the situation in the world...has seriously deteriorated as a result of the strengthening of the aggressive attempts of the imperialist states." Shelepin backed that Brezhnev-like formulation with harsh attacks on the United States and, in particularly sulphurous tones, on West Germany. Regarding West Germany, he echoed East German leader Ulbricht's distortion by saying that "in the German Federal Republic revanchism is raised to the level of state policy." (Brezhnev made a similar statement in July 1966.) Shelepin discussed not only the standard theme of the supposed West German hunger for nuclear weapons, but also the less discussed, highly emotional issue of alleged West German claims to Soviet territory (presumably East Prussia, now Kaliningradskaya Oblast). And he capped his remarks with an alarmist conjuration dealing with the potential of the FRG to develop into a power "which is able to plunge the world into another, a third world war."

Domestic Conservatism: Shelepin's 3 March 1967 election remarks on domestic policy matters dovetailed logically with his December foreign policy pronouncements. On the subject of the state of the Soviet economy, Shelepin discussed consumer goods production "briefly" (his word) --though consumer goods production was then his chief politburo task.** (He gave considerable attention to

*The excerpted passages of Shelepin's 4 March 1967 Kalinin election speech as rendered by Moscow domestic radio did not include remarks on international affairs. And his speech on 12 May on the occasion of presenting the Order of Lenin to the Bryansk Region was only noted in the press.

**His assignment to consumer affairs in the Secretariat and, more recently, his downgrading to trade union chief, seems to have been among the consequences of moves within the ruling group to curb his influence in organizational questions and cadres appointments within the central committee. Shelepin's slide highlights the influence of Kremlin power politics over policy, inasmuch as he was one of the most eager backers of the hard line introduced by Brezhnev.

SECRET

SECRET

consumer goods production in his June election speech last year, but in that speech he was careful to list the task of "considerably increasing" production before the task of increasing the standard of living.) And in his election remarks this year he reiterated his past view that the party and government are "firmly adhering to the priority development of heavy industry."

POLYANSKIY: REFORM AT HOME, CAUTION ABROAD

Internal Policy: The contrasts between the domestic policy formulations of Polyanskiy and the "metal eaters" on the politburo have been striking. Polyanskiy's 2 March 1967 election speech attacked "conceited comrades" who were arguing for a cut in allocations to the agricultural sector--the sector, in Polyanskiy's view (23 July 1966 Syktyvkar speech), which determines "to a large extent" the growth of the nation's economy as a whole and the raising of the Soviet citizen's standard of living." Thus in launching his barrage against the heavy industrialists, Polyanskiy did not call (as Shelepin did on the next day) for the utilization of the supposed "big reserve existing everywhere." Polyanskiy said:

Above all, to insure fulfillment of the plans envisaged, there must be full allocation and the best possible utilization of planned capital investments and material-technical means. This has to be said because the good results of the last agricultural year have gone to the heads of some comrades. Some people are beginning to argue that collective and state farms are now able to develop with less substantial aid, that melioration plans can be cut and supplies of technical equipment and mineral fertilizers reduced. Such arguments are extremely dangerous, for they could delay implementation of the planned program and any attempts in that direction must be resolutely nipped in the bud.

(That Polyanskiy has been fighting an uphill battle is suggested by Moscow's official mid-year status report on the Soviet economy which indicates that the growth rates

SECRET

SECRET

for agricultural and chemical equipment for the first six months of 1967 are down relative to the rates of growth of the two preceeding periods in 1966. The status report for 1967 also suggests that expanding military expenditures have virtually pre-empted the planned expanded production of agricultural machinery.)

In his next major speech (10 June in Blagoveshchensk) Polyanskiy reiterated earlier arguments for a "more correct and more proportional development of all branches of the country's production" and presented the consumer's case in argumentative terms (which of course, may be read as an attack on Chinese Communist fanaticism):

Let some personages [deyateli] who have lost their mind talk as though the desire to live better is a bourgeois prejudice.

With regard to the heavy industry sector, Polyanskiy stated that the party "will continue to devote special attention to the continuous growth of heavy industry"--rather than stating Shelepin's different tack that the party "firmly adheres to the priority development" of that sector. In other words, Polyanskiy was arguing that the party should not go overboard with, and be inflexible toward the development of the heavy industry sector. (The party should merely devote attention to continue industrial growth, rather than "firmly adhere" to the "priority development" of heavy industry.)

Polyanskiy has repeatedly argued that discipline alone is not the method to overcome economic shortcomings. (Shelepin, on the other hand, called for tightening discipline throughout the economy and cracking down on those who "rest content," who are "conceited" and who "close their eyes to shortcomings," and called upon such sinners to engage in "self-criticism.") In his election speech in June 1966, Polyanskiy aimed an attack at the disciplinarians by warning that a policy of tightening discipline would fail unless it was combined with "comradely feelings" toward honest workers and responsiveness to the urgent needs and demands of everyone. And in line with Kosygin's emphasis on "collectivity," Polyanskiy in his June 1966 speech asserted (in the present tense) the

SECRET

SECRET

importance of "constantly" observing Leninist norms and style of party and state leadership and he declared that the party must eradicate "subjectivist" approach, "willfulness," "rudeness" and an "incorrect attitude" toward fellow workers. To emphasize his argument, he cited Lenin's assertion--a reference to Lenin's comments on Stalin's behavior--that rudeness in contacts with fellow workers and subordinates was impermissible.*

While advocating a tactful approach in personnel policy, Polyanskiy's comments on liberal Soviet writers have been as dogmatic as Suslov's and Brezhnev's blasts at the "anti-social" and alien trends in Soviet society and literature. For example, Polyanskiy in Blagoveshchensk accused American anti-Communists of endeavoring "to use for hostile activities any scum, from Kerensky to crazy story writer Tarsis. And now, enticed by the American dollars, Alliluyeva [Stalin's daughter], the fanatical servant of God and God seeker, has been drawn into this dirty cause."

Foreign Views: Polyanskiy has frequently cited the same "facts" used by his hard line politburo colleagues to demonstrate that U.S. activity is both worldwide and aggressive. In particular in his 23 July 1966 speech in Syktyvkar, Polyanskiy played down the potential dangers of the U.S. activity in Vietnam (U.S. action here has led to a "more tense" world situation) and fanned the fears of a conflagration emerging from the West:


Great anxiety is caused among Soviet people by another hotbed of tension in the very center of Europe. The West German imperialists, supported by U.S. ruling circles, are working to gain access to nuclear weapons. They shout openly about revenge and about a review of the existing frontiers. This is nothing but the unleashing of a new world war.

*He also cited Lenin's statement that "heads" have no right to be "rude and nervous" precisely because they are heads. Polyanskiy's admonitions against rudeness and nervousness almost surely mirrored bruised feelings over the conduct of somebody (a "head" apparently) in the "collective" leadership.

SECRET

SECRET

But his statements on the required level of Soviet defense expenditures (like his statements on the heavy industry sector) have cautioned against going overboard. And his defense-related formulas have generally been embellished with references to past sacrifices, the adequacy of present Soviet might, the need to avert war, and the need to simultaneously continue "constructive work" while working on defenses.



Polianskiy



Voronov

VORONOV: PRODUCTION AND PRAGMATISM

Voronov has been careful to hew to Brezhnev's line since Khrushchev's fall stressing the primacy of production over consumption in economic policy. ("The main economic task for the new five-year plan consists of insuring a further considerable growth of industry, steady development rates in agriculture, and, thanks to this, of achieving

SECRET

SECRET

a substantial rise in the people's living standards." (10 December 1966 Smolensk speech.) But like Kosygin he has stressed the efficacy of science and technology as the means of raising labor productivity and meeting consumer needs. Thus, he has been an outspoken defender of the technocracy. In his 3 June 1966 election speech, for example, he stressed that Kosygin's economic reform entailed recognition on the part of the party that "economic and engineering-technical workers have accumulated great experience in socialist and Communist construction and can decide independently important complex tasks with an awareness of what they are doing." Kosygin has also made a similar--but not so explicit--reference to the important role of the technocrats, but such references to the autonomous role of technicians are not frequent in leaders' speeches.

Paralleling the bulk of his domestic policy pronouncements, he has sided with those who stress the influence of economic example--rather than militancy--on the issue of world revolution. Voronov has also voiced Kosygin's line on establishing bilateral business-like relations with the states of Western Europe. In the wake of his late 1966 visit to the U.K., he repeatedly spoke of the "unexploited possibilities" for the development of bilateral economic and cultural contacts between Britain and the Soviet Union.

MAZUROV: IDEOLOGICAL DISCIPLINE AND CONSERVATISM

Mazurov has displayed a basic conservatism on questions of economic policy. He was closely associated with the ministerial re-centralization after Khrushchev's fall and in his 20 May 1966 election speech pointed out that the post-Khrushchev restructuring of industrial management (i.e., along more traditional lines) was based on "ideological principle"--the implication being that Khrushchev's reforms lacked this essential characteristic. He recalled in his 1966 and 1967 election speeches the charges against

SECRET


SECRET



Mazurov



Shelest



Kirilenko



Pelshe

-80-

SECRET

SECRET

Khrushchev's policy (many leaders have now dispensed with this)--namely, the underestimation of objective economic laws, voluntarism and subjectivism. In his 1966 and 1967 election speech he was careful to note that new plan's aim of accelerated growth rates for both heavy and consumer industry was occurring under the umbrella of the maintenance of the preferential development of the means of production.

Mazurov has stressed the role of economics in policy citing Lenin on the point but not the Khrushchevian formula that politics is subordinated to economics. In the past he has used the formula on economics as a most important policy which was used under Khrushchev by those who did not accept the more explicit and radical Khrushchev formulation. Mazurov has also given stress to ideological indoctrination. He said that "Communist morality, strict and conscientious discipline is possible only in uncompromising, persistent struggle against bourgeois ideology and propaganda, against indifference to politics, survivals of private ownership attitudes a...nihilistic attitude toward national ideals and triumphs" (20 May 1966). And in his recent Leningrad speech, he took a different tack on labor policy than that taken by Polyanskiy. Mazurov emphasized solely the "struggle for strict labor discipline."

On foreign policy issues, Mazurov has closely adhered to Brezhnev's policy guide lines. Regarding Europe, his recent Leningrad remarks stressed joint bloc receptivity to West European interest in economic cooperation. He was sharply critical of the "hostile policies" of the Kiesinger-Brandt coalition which, he said, were backed by the U.S. in order to try to "maintain tension and dissidence" in Europe. A similar goal is assigned by Mazurov to U.S. activity elsewhere in the globe.

SECRET

SECRET

SHELEST: ORGANIZATIONAL DISCIPLINE AND DEFENSE

Like Mazurov's, Shelest's foreign and domestic policy statements bear the conservative trademark. He has made consumer well-being conditional on future successes in the industrial and agricultural sector. He has repeatedly emphasized the need for increasing discipline--citing on one occasion (25 November 1966 Ukrainian plenum report) Brezhnev's 1966 election statement that "people's rule was unthinkable without conscious discipline and a high level of organization." He, like Suslov, has also strongly seconded Brezhnev's and Podgornyy's proposals for strengthening the powers of the Supreme Soviet vis-a-vis Kosygin's Council of Ministers.*

With little variation, Shelest's comments on external affairs have stressed the need to strengthen defenses, raise vigilance and "intensify the struggle against the American imperialists and the perfidious intentions of the West German revanchists." Not all his comments, however, have echoed this line: on one occasion (26 January 1967 speech) he resurrected, in part, one of Khrushchev's favorites by asserting that "the world socialist system is winning ever new victories in the economic competition with capitalism." (Under Khrushchev, "peaceful economic competition" was regarded as the "main" arena of struggle with capitalism--not as one of many struggles, as Shelest and the 50th anniversary Theses have it.)

*While he has apparently adopted positions on economic and organizational questions that contrast with those held by Kosygin, on matters of nationalities policy--in particular the rarely discussed matter of the status of Jews in the Soviet Union--Shelest's 17 October 1965 remark that Jews made an important contribution to the Ukrainian victory in World War II followed Kosygin's unusual 18 July 1965 assertion that anti-semitism was alien to the Communist world outlook. The other politburo members have apparently remained silent on this issue.

SECRET

SECRET

KIRILENKO: REFORM AND WELL-BEING "NOW"

Kirilenko has consistently displayed a pro-consumer bias. He was one of the first Soviet leaders to press for the growth of consumer goods at a rate similar to the growth of heavy industry (24 July 1965 Vladivostok speech). And his recent remarks on the need for greater attention to the consumer sector are reminiscent of Khrushchev's mid-1964 reference to "goulash Communism." Kirilenko cited Lenin's "testament" that under socialism "everyone wants the good things of life," and Kirilenko went on to state that the CPSU "fulfills Lenin's testament in every way." In the same speech, Kirilenko paraphrased Podgornyy's 1965 Baku formula (discussed on page 62); Kirilenko argued that in light of the party's solicitude for production, consumer industries are "now able to advance more quickly." Unlike Brezhnev at the 1966 Party Congress, Kirilenko did not base an increase in consumer goods production upon "successes achieved in the development of heavy industry," nor did he voice Brezhnev's congress line that the party would give "more rapid development" to the heavy industry sector. And in the same address, Kirilenko strongly endorsed Kosygin's economic reforms and pointedly criticized "certain workers" who adhere to the "old ways."* A similar criticism was recently leveled in an Izvestiya editorial (19 August 1967) against ferrous metallurgy planners who "frequently do not

*But on matters of domestic politics (not policy), Kirilenko has done much to contribute to the Brezhnev "personality cult." On 1 December 1966 Kirilenko at Novorossiysk bestowed on Brezhnev qualities once reserved for Khrushchev; Kirilenko said that "it gives me great pleasure to mention that the general secretary of our party's central committee, L.I. Brezhnev, who at that time was head of the political section of the 18th Army, was among the ranks of the servicemen who fought for Novorossiysk and among the defenders of the "Little Land" [the location of a landing operation in February 1943]. Under his leadership, many-sided party and political work was conducted among the units and groups of units under complex fighting conditions. Participants in the struggle for Novorossiysk remember with great warmth the indefatigable activity of Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, his personal bravery and steadfastness and his profound ideological conviction, which served as models of partymindedness and military valor."

SECRET

SECRET

take into consideration the achievements of science and technology" and "implement decisions based on yesterday's positions."*

On foreign policy subjects, particularly U.S.-USSR relations, Kirilenko has generally hewed to the Brezhnev line. That is, that an end to U.S. "interference" in the internal affairs of foreign countries (i.e. not just Vietnam) is the precondition to improving relations with the Soviet Union. Kirilenko in Chile in October 1965 also strongly endorsed CPSU support for anti-American popular fronts.

PELSHE: THE CAUTIOUS NEWCOMER

Pelshe, elevated to the politburo at last year's party congress, has skillfully skirted virtually all the major controversial domestic economic issues. He has discussed both industrial and consumer production but, apparently, has not linked the two sectors in a formula that would clearly betray his personal preference. In his seemingly well-coordinated speech at the French CP Congress in early January this year, Pelshe listed the party's task of satisfying the "material and spiritual interests" of the Soviet people after the task of increasing "economic and political strength." On another occasion as the politburo spokesman, Pelshe discussed in somewhat more detail and gave more effusive praise to Soviet accomplishments in the heavy (rather than light) industry sector. (6 November 1966 revolution anniversary speech) But as mentioned earlier, the fact that these speeches appear to be heavily coordinated renders them less useful for the purpose of defining individual positions on key themes.

Treading very cautiously as a new politburo member, Pelshe has given praise to the decisions reached at Brezhnev's March 1965 agricultural plenum and Kosygin's September 1965 industrial plenum. But in his 30 March speech at the 23rd Party Congress, Pelshe repeatedly praised Brezhnev by name and endorsed Brezhnev's suggestion to create a system of "elective collective farm cooperative bodies." The cooperative

*Interestingly, the Izvestiya editorial did not state that the allocations would be increased in the ferrous metallurgy sector for 1968. Rather, the editorial, after reporting that the 1968 state plan for this sector was "recently confirmed," concluded that the "growth of production of steel and rolled metal is in the main intended to be through an improvement of the work of the operating units."

SECRET

SECRET

system (of which Podgornyy also approved), if ever implemented, would do little to enhance the authority of the recentralized Ministry of Agriculture under Kosygin's Council of Ministers.

In the sphere of external policy, it is interesting to note that in his congress speech Pelshe reshuffled the goals that Brezhnev had set for Soviet foreign policy. Pelshe listed "peaceful coexistence" at the top, strengthening the socialist camp at the bottom of a list of Soviet foreign policy goals. Other than his particular listing of the USSR's external goals, Pelshe's positions on key foreign policy issues have not been made clear.

CANDIDATE (NON-VOTING) MEMBERS

Andropov: Andropov (the new KGB chairman) has sided with Brezhnev on most major foreign policy issues. For example, in his election speech (4 March 1967 Novomoskovsk) Andropov referred to "peaceful coexistence" in a passage devoted only to improving relations with West European states. Regarding Soviet relations with the United States, Andropov voiced the line most consistently espoused by Brezhnev; that is, that the supposed worldwide masterplan of the United States precluded the development of U.S.-Soviet relations. Andropov said:

In the interests of international peace, our country is also ready to improve relations with the United States. However, comrades, U.S. officials talk a great deal about their love of peace, about the need to respect human rights and the dignity of the peoples; but what are their actual deeds? The United States supports the militarist circles of West Germany. The United States is the inspirer of all the aggressive blocs in the world. Any people who rise up to fight for their national liberation are confronted with direct or indirect aggression by U.S. imperialism. That is what happened in Korea, Guatemala, Cuba, the Congo, the Dominican Republic, and finally, as everyone knows, that is what is happening in Vietnam.

Regarding domestic economic positions, Andropov seemed to favor the consumers' interests inasmuch as he listed "people's well being" before raising "production" (heavy industry) and by reiterating the reformers' trademark--the formula calling for an approximation of the

SECRET

SECRET

rates of growth in the heavy and light sectors of the economy. Andropov's "liberal" image was sharpened by one [redacted] after his KGB promotion which stated that certain Soviet intellectuals welcomed his new status. On the other hand, another source recently reported that the Moscow intellectual community was alarmed by the rumor--which circulated immediately after Andropov's KGB appointment--that the Soviet censorship organ, Glavlit, would soon become part of the KGB.

Demichev: In his speeches Demichev in one way gives the appearance of being a neo-Zhdanovite ideologue who takes a strong line on combatting the influx of "hostile bourgeois ideology" in the USSR and intensifying indoctrination and ideological controls within the country. Thus he seems to have been very much allied with the post-Khrushchev re-emphasis on the party's ideological role in Soviet society. On the other hand, he also conveys the impression of sophistication seeking ways of revitalizing

SECRET

SECRET

and adapting official doctrine to contemporary Soviet conditions. He clearly is not a rigid neo-Stalinist, and has stressed the need for theorists to come to grips with the new social science disciplines.

Nonetheless, in his speeches, Demichev strikes all the main themes of the 23rd Congress on ideological matters. He has often spoken of the "ideological war" being waged against the USSR by the West and attacks the "notorious tactics of building bridges" which he asserts are designed to soften and corrupt Communism from within. Demichev also stressed the "still existing heterogeneity of our society." This suggestion that all traces of the class struggle in the USSR internally have not been removed is a line dampening to Khrushchev's notion of a society which had become homogeneous and a state of the whole people. Notably, in this latter connection, Demichev plugged the line (which Polyanskiy tacitly criticized) on the need for intensification of work discipline and the struggle against "anti-social phenomena." Demichev stressed that this was not a short-term campaign caused by extraordinary circumstances and linked it with the broad campaign to educate the new Soviet man. He also repeated the theme that the enemy sought to implant nihilism in Soviet youth by exploiting the shortcomings and errors "which occurred in our history" (the Stalin period). Demichev read the party's message to the 22-27 May 1967 Soviet Writers Congress ordering that the writers' union work to defeat the enemy from within; the union "must continue to work for rallying creative forces on the fundamental party basis, to shape collective views on fundamental ideological-creative problems, to promote the ideological tempering of writers, to shape their Marxist-Leninist outlook, devoting particular attention to young writers." At the same time in his comments on economic policy, Demichev has portrayed himself as a spokesman for traditional interests.

SECRET

SECRET

Kunayev: Kunayev, an unmistakable protege of Brezhnev,* has stuck closely to his principal concern--Kazakh agriculture. Notably, he strongly boosted the ambitious program for land reclamation presented by Brezhnev at the May 1966 plenum and in his 1966 election speech made claims for the program not unlike those once asserted for Khrushchev's virgin lands project. Kunayev thus noted that the new policy will help produce increases in agricultural output "in a short time" and warned--perhaps aiming his warning at those lukewarm toward reclamation as a panacea--that "we must all understand" the land reclamation project was not a short-lived campaign, but a long term program of planned expansion of agricultural lands. On broader areas of policy--such as the hard line toward the United States, and the heavy industry priority--Kunayev has echoed Brezhnev.

Grishin: Conservative economic formulations emphasizing production over consumption and appeals for the strengthening of the Supreme Soviet mark Grishin, the newly appointed Moscow city secretary, as a Brezhnevite. (Though at the November 1962 plenum, Grishin showed himself to be a proponent of economic accountability--a

*When Belyayev was made the scapegoat for failures in the virgin lands in December 1959--January 1960, Kunayev who was the second highest official in Kazakhstan next to Belyayev emerged unscathed. The interesting thing is that Khrushchev heaped abuse on Kunayev equal to that he gave Belyayev, but Kunayev subsequently prospered and Belyayev went into oblivion. Brezhnev who was linked with the virgin lands project in 1954-55 and who was involved in the purging of Belyayev undoubtedly was instrumental in saving Kunayev's political neck at the time. It would seem that Kunayev's gratitude has not diminished with time. His election speech in June 1966, for example, is replete with references showing that Kunayev regards Brezhnev as his boss and personal leader. ("As Comrade Brezhnev recommended..." "the Central Committee and Comrade Brezhnev personally..." "in his May plenum report Comrade Brezhnev said,..." and so forth.)

SECRET

SECRET

reform stressed by Kosygin in 1965.) Grishin has strongly seconded agricultural proposals introduced by Brezhnev, and like Kunayev, Grishin in his public speeches has often praised Brezhnev by name. Generally steering clear of contentious foreign policy issues, Grishin in an 18 November 1965 speech in Belgrade seconded Brezhnev's December 1964 and Suslov's October 1965 call for an anti-imperialist united front and called for joint action of all European trade unions to oppose the nuclear arming of the West German Army. Grishin's comments on the supposed global ambitions of the United States have not varied substantially from Suslov's or Brezhnev's.

Mzhavanadze: In line with Suslov, Georgian party leader Mzhavanadze has concentrated on the ideological role of the party and on what he has called the "purity of the party ranks." In his 12 June 1967 Georgian central committee speech he cited Stalin (as he had done in his 23rd Congress report and his report at the June 1965 Georgian Central Committee plenum) on the matter of selecting faithful party members. And in his election speeches of the last three years he has stressed the need for discipline and vigilance against the "slightest deviation" from Marxism-Leninism. Mzhavanadze has employed Stalin's device of pledging that the individual and his welfare is the "highest aim" of the party, and then going on to list industrial production before the other tasks of the party, such as increasing living standards. Not only has he listed the party's tasks in the style of Leonid Brezhnev (and Stalin), he has also given particularly obsequious praise to the current general secretary. In his 1 November 1966 Tbilisi speech, for example, Mzhavanadze thanked "dear Ilich" (Brezhnev's and, incidentally, Lenin's patronymic) for giving an award to the Georgian republic and assured "our dear Leonid" that existing shortcomings in the republic would be eliminated. Georgian problems have occupied the bulk of Mzhavanadze's time. Accordingly, he has given only sporadic attention to routine theme of "U.S. imperialism" in Vietnam.

Rashidov: Borrowing a term used by his Chinese neighbors, Uzbek party leader Rashidov has occupied himself with what he called in his 1967 election speech the

SECRET

SECRET

"leap forward" in industry and agriculture in his republic. While only a few of his policy remarks have been made available, the pattern that emerges wears a Brezhnev look. On the issue of the relative powers of Kosygin's Council of Ministers and Podgornyy's Supreme Soviet, Rashidov concentrated (in his 13 April speech this year) on increasing the role of the latter on a national level, such as increasing soviet control over the ministries, and on a local level, such as granting added authority to the village and settlement soviets. And on the matter of thwarting the alleged global and villainous actions and intentions of the United States, Rashidov in a Djakarta speech in late May 1965 voiced Brezhnev's and Suslov's call for united action of all "anti-imperialist forces." Repeating that call at the 3-12 January 1966 Tri-Continental Congress in Havana, Rashidov unveiled the particularly militant definition that Moscow's peaceful coexistence doctrine did not apply in the underdeveloped world where people are fighting for their "liberation."

We believe that relations between sovereign states with different social structures should be based on peaceful coexistence. However, it is quite clear that there is no peaceful coexistence, nor can there be peaceful coexistence between the oppressed peoples and their oppressors--the colonialists and the imperialists, between the imperialist aggressors and their victims.

(In the wake of strong reaction from Latin American governments, the Soviet Foreign Ministry took the unusual action of privately disavowing Rashidov's statements and passed the word through Brazilian and Uruguayan ambassadors that Rashidov had spoken to the conference as an unofficial, "non-governmental" delegate. The disavowal appeared to be hypocritical, since Rashidov was most likely given explicit guidance both prior to and during the Havana conference.)

Shcherbitskiy: A Brezhnevite of long-standing, Ukrainian Council of Ministers chairman Shcherbitskiy has consistently displayed a bias in favor of heavy industry interests, and in December 1965 he took exception to CPSU

SECRET

SECRET

Secretary Kapitonov's listing of the three main features of the 1966 budget. The budget as presented by Kapitonov (then a member of the Budget Commission of the Supreme Soviet's Council of the Union*) called for a general upsurge of the nation's economy, a growth in living standards, and, thirdly, a strengthening of the nation's military might. Shcherbitskiy at the same session (7 December 1965) reversed the order of the last two features and in his subsequent speeches he proceeded to press even more vigorously for defense priorities. In his 3 March election speech this year, for example, he interpreted his nomination as a candidate to the Supreme Soviet as a signal of "complete approval" of the CPSU's "general policy line and its unremitting struggle to strengthen the Soviet Union's might." He has frequently paid deference to Brezhnev, citing the general secretary on such subjects as the importance of moral incentives and "Bolshevik" self-sacrifice. Shcherbitskiy has given attention to the matter of selection of qualified party cadres, but unlike his colleague Mzhavanadze, Shcherbitskiy has stressed the practical--not ideological--need for party cadres to study economics and modern methods of production.

Ustinov: Befitting his party responsibilities as Brezhnev's defense-industry expert, Ustinov has based his frequent appeals for increased defense expenditures on the "belligerent tendencies" of West German "revengers" in Europe and on the U.S. policy of "armed attack" on the DRV and "constant pressure" on Cuba and North Korea. Accordingly, Ustinov has consistently given priority to the heavy industry sector. In an apparent effort to expand his heavy-defense industry empire, Ustinov seemed to be promoting the idea of diversification by pressing for

*Kapitonov, incidentally, was not re-elected to the budget commission, which was reorganized into the 51-man Planning-Budget Commission at the August 1966 Supreme Soviet session. He retained, however, the important chairmanship of the central committee department that controls personnel appointments.

-91-

SECRET

the utilization of certain defense industry plants for Soviet automobile manufacture. He promoted the production of Soviet automobiles in his 4 June 1966 election speech, and did not comment on the planned domestic production of the Italian Fiat car--a consumer industry project associated with Kosygin. (The heavy industry sector was not linked to the project to expand automobile production which Kosygin introduced in his 19 April 1965 Gosplan speech. In fact, in his private discussions with the president of Fiat later in the year, Kosygin reportedly indicated the desire to reduce defense industry costs and, with the attendant savings, to shift from the production of conventional armaments and nuclear weapons to more intensive development of the consumer industries.)

Masherov: Like his republic party predecessor (Mazurov), Belorussian First Secretary Masherov has emphasized the "preferential development of the production of the means of production belonging to group A"--the heavy-defense industry sector. And in his brief March 1967 Minsk election speech he ignored the consumer industries altogether and concentrated solely on industrial growth in Belorussia. In his 1966 election speech he talked about production of refrigerators, television sets and so forth, but he concluded his remarks on that subject by counter-balancing material goods and Communist ideals.

While showing constant care for improving the material well-being and the cultural level of the Soviet people, the party simultaneously gives great attention to the

SECRET

upbringing of everybody in the spirit of Communism. The moulding of the Communist world outlook and of high ethical standards will lead to a further strengthening of conscious discipline among workers.

And with regard to strengthening Soviet military might, Masherov has proved to be a loyal supporter of the defense interests. He also has employed one of Stalin's old practices of using military terminology in referring to organs of the party. Thus, in Masherov's style, the CPSU central committee is "the battle headquarters."

CONCLUDING OBSERVATION

In conclusion, the vagaries of Kremlin politics must be kept in mind, for the patterns in the leader's policy statements described in part two of this paper are not immune from substantial transformations. The pursuit of a given policy in the Soviet environment has not infrequently been subordinated to political expediency on the part of a given leader and his coterie. (In addition, Kremlin cliques have been notoriously precarious. All are unstable.) Kosygin's gradual and temporary backing away in the summer of 1965 from his own version of detente abroad and concentration on civilian economics at home may well have reflected a tentative compromise aimed at preventing a rout--such as the defeat of his economic reform plan (adopted amid rumors of his imminent retirement)--in the face of his losing battle to cut the Soviet military budget. The identifiable policy patterns have, nonetheless, displayed a remarkable degree of consistency during the post-Khrushchev period. The remarks of the individual leaders have reflected power and policy struggles and should provide a useful backdrop against which future struggles can be better understood.

SECRET

~~Secret~~



~~Secret~~